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Perjury! The Charges and the Defenses
Richard H. Underwood*

His disciples questioned him and said to him, "Do you want us to fast?
How shall we pray? Shall we give alms? What diet shall we observe?"
Jesus said, "Do not tell lies, and do not do what you hate, for all things
are plain in the sight of Heaven. For nothing hidden will not become
manifest, and nothing covered will remain without being uncovered."
The Gospel of Thomas'
In Ndstrond [Hell] I saw the peijurers.
Volospd (old Norse epic), line 392
* J.D., The Ohio State University; Spears-Gilbert Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky, College of Law, Lexington, Kentucky; Chairman, Kentucky Bar Association Ethics
Committee (1984-present). A version of this article will appear as Chapters 3 and 4 in a
forthcoming book styled False Witness: The Law and Lore of Perjury and Other Forensic
Mischief. I would like to thank Professors Gene Gaetke and Sarah Welling of the University
of Kentucky College of Law for their helpful comments. Professor Welling has just completed
her treatise on Federal Criminal Law for West Publishing Company.
1. THE OTHER BIBLE: ANCIENT ESOTERIC TEXTS 300 (Willis Barnstone, ed., 1984). See also
MARvIN W. MEYER, THE SECRET SAYINGS OF JESUS: FouR GNosrc GOSPELS 20-21 (1984). The
Gospel of Thomas is said to be a part of Codex II, one of the Nag Hammadi manuscripts. Id.

at 32-34.
2. Quoted in C.S. LEwIs,

THE ABOLITION OF MAN

112 (1947) (reprinted in 1955).
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INTRODUCTION

The law of man is somewhat more complicated than the simple
guide set forth in The Gospel of Thomas. It is also wanting of
enforcement. There may be a lot of perjurers in Ndstrond, but
there are relatively few in earthly "slammers." A 1995 article in the
American Bar Association Journal quotes judges and lawyers to
the effect that "perjury is being committed with greater frequency
and impunity than ever before," but that prosecution of perjury "is
a low priority for resource-strapped prosecutors just when it is
apparently on the rise."3 Perjury "undermines the whole process
.. . [but] . .. [t]he problem is so bad that it is severely
evaporating confidence people have in the court system." 4 Judges
say that "more lawyers appearing before them are bending the
truth, not telling the whole truth, or just plain lying about
5
everything from discovery to the holdings of prior decisions."
These problems are not confined to the criminal courts. One
prosecutor is quoted as saying that "[i]f perjury were water, the
people in civil court would be drowning. And if I were to prosecute
all the perjury cases just in civil courts, I would tie up five
prosecutors full time."6 Many lawyers answer that all of this is the
natural result, and the tolerable cost, of an adversary system of
justice,7 but the "professional excuse" is wearing a little thin.
3. Mark Curriden, The Lies Have It: Judges Maintain That PerjuryIs on the Rise, but
the Court System May Not Have Enough Resources to Stem the Tide, ABAJ., May 1995, at
68. See also Jonathan Liebman and Joel Cohen, Perjury and Civil Litigation, 20 LITIG. 43
(1994).
[B]usy prosecutors often disdain involvement in civil cases. They believe (sometimes
correctly) that civil litigators try to enlist prosecutors for private purposes;
prosecutors do not relish being in the middle of civil disputes . . . [and] . . . unless
civil perjury affects a government interest or an ongoing criminal investigation,
prosecutors often conclude that society's interests would be better served devoting
limited prosecutorial resources to pursuing other crimes, instead of promoting
truth-telling in civil litigation.
Id. at 44-45; Lisa Harris, Perjury Defeats Justice, 42 WAYNE L. REv. 1755 (1996) ("[P]ejury
has thus far evaded all solutions, is pervasive in the courtroom, and is on the increase."). Id.
at 1755.
4. Curriden, supra note 3, at 69 (quoting David C. Weiner, ABA Litigation Section

Chair).
5. Id. at 70 (citing interviews with sitting judges).
6. Id. (quoting Milwaukee prosecutor, E. Michael McCann).
7. Cf Dan B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CoRNELL L REV. 183 (1971)
The lying witness is one of the things the system is designed to cope with through
devices such as cross-examination... We expect trials to involve issues of fact and,
pretty regularly, a certain amount of lying under oath. We can cope with it by
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I have traced the history of perjury, right up to current federal
law, in other articles. 8 Here, I take a closer look at the federal
perjury statutes, take a quick glance at the law of a rural state out
in the "heartland," and then say a few more words about
enforcement. I hope to address the subject of professional ethics
another day.
THE CHARGES
Emilia: You told a lie, an odious, damned lie,
Upon my soul, a lie, a wicked lie!
William Shakespeare, Othello,
Act V., sc. ii., lines 180-81
Shallow: I will make a Star-chamber matter of it.
William Shakespeare, The Merry Wives
of Windsor, Act I., sc. i., lines 1-2

Here are the modem American 9 [federal] perjury statutes:
Section 1621. Perjury generally
Whoever (1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal,
officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the
United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that
he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that
any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or
certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and
contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material
matter which he does not believe to be true; or
(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or
statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under
section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully
subscribes as true any material matter which he does not
believe to be true;
cross-examination, the use of other testimony, and the common sense of the trier of
fact. .
[T]he system can and does work with perjury and in fact is designed to do
SO.
Id. at 194.
8. See, e.g., Richard H. Underwood, False Witness: A Lawyer's History of the Law of
Perjury, 10 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L 215 (1993) ("False Witness"); Richard H. Underwood,
Perjury: An Anthology, 13 ARIz. J. INT'L & Comp. L 307 (1996) ("Anthology").
9. Originally, this article was written for a foreign audience.
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is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable
whether the statement or subscription is made within or
without the United States. 10
Section 1623. False declarations before grand jury or court
(a) Whoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate,
verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as
permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code)
in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand
jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material
declaration or makes or uses any other information, including
any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other
material, knowing the same to contain any false material
declaration, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(b) This section is applicable whether the conduct occurred
within or without the United States.
(c) An indictment or information for violation of this section
alleging that, in any proceedings before or ancillary to any
court or grand jury of the United States, the defendant under
oath has knowingly made two or more declarations, which are
inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily
false, need not specify which declaration is false if
(1) each declaration was material to the point in question,
and
(2) each declaration was made within the period of the
statute of limitations for the offense charged under this
section.
In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of a
declaration set forth in the indictment or information shall be
established sufficient for conviction by proof that the
defendant while under oath made irreconcilably contradictory
declarations material to the point in question in any
proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury. It
shall be a defense to an indictment or information made
pursuant to the first sentence of this subsection that the
defendant at the time he made each declaration believed the
10.

18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1984 & West Supp. 1998).

1998

Perjury!

declaration was true.
(d) Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury
proceeding in which a declaration is made, the person making
the declaration admits such declaration to be false, such
admission shall bar prosecution under this section if, at the
time the admission is made, the declaration has not
substantially affected the proceeding, or it has not become
manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed.
(e) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is
sufficient for conviction. It shall not be necessary that such
proof be made by any particular number of witnesses or by
documentary or other type of evidence."
PROCEEDINGS TO WHICH THE PERJURY STATUTES ARE APPLICABLE

Both the "general" or "old" perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. section
1621, and the "new" perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. section 1623, make
the taking of an "oath" an element of the crime of perjury. Under
section 1621, the oath must be taken before a competent' 2 "officer,
tribunal, or person," whereas, under section 1623, the oath must be
taken before or ancillary to a proceeding before a United States
court or grand jury., 3 In other words, the geographical reach of the
"general" perjury statute is greater, in the sense that section 1621
punishes perjury in congressional hearings whereas section 1623
does not.14 On the other hand, under section 1621, there must be
proof that the oath was administered by one competent and
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1984 & West Supp. 1998).
12. United States v. Reinecke, 524 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (conviction of California
Lieutenant Governor who testified falsely before a Senate panel reviewing nomination of
Richard Kliendienst for Attorney General of the United States was later reversed because
there had not been a proper quorum at the time the testimony was taken). See Underwood,
Anthology, supra note 8, at 367. See also United States v. Weissman, (unpublished
disposition) 1996 WL 742844 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 20, 1996) (discussion of oath, competency of
tribunal, and other issues; charges of peijury in deposition testimony given to Senate
subcommittee staff members and testimony before subcommittee).
13. In United States v. McAfee, the court held that section 1623 applies to depositions
in civil cases. McAfee, 8 F.3d 1010 (5th Cir. 1993). In Dunn v. United States, however, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the statute does not apply to the taking of an
affidavit in a lawyer's office. Dunn, 442 U.S. 100 (1979). But in United States v. Tibbs, the
court found that if the affidavit were filed or used in some way in a proceeding, the statute
would apply. Tibbs, 600 F.2d 19 (6th Cir. 1979).
14. A memorable case in point is United States v. Haldeman, 559 F2d 31 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, sub nom. Erlichman v. United States, 431 U.S. 933 (1977). See "The Sorry
Case of the President's Men" in Underwood, Anthology, supra note 8, at 307. See also
Seymour Glanzer, CongressionalInvestigations, 134 PLIiCimu. 21 (1984).
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authorized to do so; whereas, in prosecutions under section 1623,
an inference might be drawn that the defendant testified under
oath since the statute is limited to statements made in court or
15
grand jury proceedings, or "ancillary" thereto.
If the perjury is before a court, the court must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter, at least at the outset.' 6 Insofar as grand
juries are concerned, it has been held that if the perjury were
committed after the grand jury exceeded its term, then the tribunal
was incompetent at the critical time.'7 Attacks based on the subject
matter of a grand jury's inquiry - that the grand jury could not
indict in the matters under investigation are sometimes
successful.18
THE OATH: FORM AND FUNCTION

How useless oaths are has been shown by experience, for every judge
will bear me out when I say that no oath has ever yet made any
criminal speak the truth; and the same thing is shown by reason, which
declares all laws to be useless, and consequently injurious which are
opposed to the natural sentiments of man.
Cesare Bonesana Di Beccaria,

On Crimes and Punishments
(1764)
Trust none, For oaths are straws...
William Shakespeare, Henry V,
Act II., sc. iii, lines 52-53

There have been many interesting cases dealing with the form of
the oath, although they deal with the question of whether the
witness should be permitted to testify, and not, strictly speaking,
with whether the oath was sufficient to support a prosecution for
perjury. Nevertheless, it is hard to see why the question of
"sufficiency" is not the very same.
A witness may "affirm" rather than swear. But the law is even
more accommodating than that, since religious objections have also
15. See United States v. Molinares, 700 F.2d 647, 650-651 (11th Cir. 1983) for further
discussion.
16. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951).
17. United States v. Fein, 504 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1974).
18. See James Neslund, Perjury and False Declarations, in WHrE COLLAR CRIME
BusiNEss AND REGULATORY OFFENSES 10-7 (Otto G. Obermeier and Robert G. Mervillo, eds.,
1990).
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721

been raised to "affirmation." 9 The intent of the law is that the
witness acknowledge that he or she will undertake to tell the truth
under penalty of perjury.20 It has been held sufficient that a witness
"declare that the facts [he/she is] about to give are, to the best of
2
[his/her] knowledge and belief, accurate, correct, and complete." '
In another case, an appellate court vindicated a witness' demand
that he be permitted to take an "alternative" oath that read, "Do
you affirm to speak with fully integrated Honesty, only with fully
integrated Honesty and nothing but fully integrated Honesty?" For
reasons that the court "[would] not attempt to explain," the witness
"believed] that honesty is superior to truth."22 "We do not have a
case where the witness offers to swear only to a cleverly worded
oath that creates loopholes for falsehood or attempts to create a
safe harbor for perjury."23
FAITrrY
A truth that's told with bad intent
beats all the lies you can invent.
William Blake, Auguries of Innocence,
lines 53-54 (c.1803)

It seems obvious that for a defendant to be convicted of perjury,
the statementsA made by the defendant that are the basis of the
19.

Ferguson v. Commissioner, 921 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1991).

20. See FED. R Evm. 603; FED. R EvID. 603 (Advisory Committee Notes); Gordon v.
Idaho, 778 E2d 1397, 1400 (9th Cir. 1985).
21. Ferguson, 921 F2d at 589 (citing Staton v. Fought, 486 So. 2d 745 (La. 1986)). In
Ferguson, the witness was prevented from giving testimony before the Tax Court although

she was willing to give the declaration set forth in Staton and even add an additional
sentence acknowledging that she was subject to the penalty for perjury. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Tax Court's exclusion of her testimony
and dismissal of her petition for lack of prosecution was an abuse of discretion. Id. at
590-91.
22.

United States v. Ward, 973 F2d 730, 731 (9th Cir. 1992). The court pointed out that

liberality as regards the adequacy of the oath predates the American Constitution (citing
Omichund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 22, 45 (1744)). Id. at 733-34.
There are limits, however. See Judge: No Death Ceremony in Court, LEXINGTON [KY.]
HRALD-LEADEa,
Dec. 13, 1997, at All (Judge Harry Crumo, in Minneapolis, would not allow a
Hmong woman, Yer Vang, to perform a native ceremony in court that would have "caused
the death of anyone who lied in the case.").
23. Id. at 734. United States v. Fowler, 605 F2d 181 (5th Cir. 1979) is a frequently cited
case of evasion. In Fowler, the witness (defendant) would only say "I am a truthful man" or

"I would not tell a lie to stay out of jail." He refused to say, "I state that I will tell the truth
in my testimony." Id. at 185.
24. I have already noted that section 1621 has a broader "geographical" reach than
section 1623. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Section 1621 is narrower in that it
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charge must be proved to have been false, and the proof must meet
the criminal burden of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt."25 It is
sometimes suggested that proof that the defendant told the literal
truth, while, perhaps, hoping to mislead, is a defense to a perjury
charge under 18 U.S.C. sections 1621 and 1623, and under 18 U.S.C.
section 1001. Indeed, I will follow this convention. 26 However, it is
important to remember that the burden of proving falsity remains
with the prosecution. The point was made in a case involving a
county judge in Texas, who claimed that money he took was for
legal services.27 His strategy was to claim that since he was a
lawyer, and that he claimed to have performed some legal services
for the money, that the government could not prove that all of the
money was not for legal services. They could not prove that he
didn't simply overcharge. Even if overcharging can reach the point
where it is criminal, overcharging is not perjury. The Fifth Circuit
conceded the principle that the burden of proof on the issue of
falsity remains on the prosecution "side of the v." - but affirmed
the judge's conviction anyway. His may have been a pyrrhic victory;
but we thank his former honor, nonetheless, for his instructions
regarding the legal technicalities. 28 They come in handy from time
to time, as we shall see in our discussion of "literal truth."
Indeed, there is good reason for making prosecutions for perjury
difficult. We do not want witnesses to be discouraged from giving
evidence. 29 "A false answer may be given because of inadvertence,
applies only to false statements and subscriptions, whereas section 1623 applies when a
witness "makes or uses" (enters, alludes to, or otherwise incorporates into the testimony)
false information or false materials (false exhibits, documents, records, or other evidence)
that contain a false material declaration. For a collection of cases discussing this issue, see
Angel Saad, Perjury, 34 Am. CRa. L REv. 857, 862 n.30 (1997). It would seem then that the
defendant who creates false documentary evidence and uses it in grand jury testimony will
run afoul of section 1623 as well as violate the obstruction of justice statutes. Compare
Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr., Grand Jury Practice, 137 PLI/GRnu. 111 (1985). Among the cases
collected by Saad is United States v. Pommerening, 500 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1974) in which the
defendants removed incriminating evidence from the corporate records and then relied upon
falsified records when they appeared before the grand jury).
25.. United States v. Martellano, 675 F2d 940 (7th Cir. 1981).
26. Compare Neslund, supra note 18, at 10-15. For a yearly survey of the cases
involving the federal law of perjury, see Symposium, White Collar Crime Project - Perjury,
published in An CRM. L REv. (Georgetown U. Law Center). The author recently had the
pleasure of serving as an outside "reviewer" for the "WCCP."
27. United States v. Parr, 516 F2d 458 (5th Cir. 1975).
28. I am reminded of a cartoon that is probably still on my door (in one of the layers)
in which a former big-wig, now jailbird, is lamenting to his lawyer something to the effect of
- "I don't believe that my integrity would ever have been questioned if I hadn't been
caught."
29. United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1986).
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honest mistake, carelessness, neglect, or misunderstanding .... "30
"Under the pressures of interrogation, it is not uncommon for the
most earnest witnesses to give answers that are not entirely
responsive. Sometimes the witness does not understand the
question, or may in an excess of caution or apprehension read too
much or too little into it. ... .1

In prosecutions predicated upon false statements made before a
grand jury, it must be remembered that the witness will not have
had counsel's advice in the grand jury room. It's the prosecutor's
turf. The prosecutor's questioning may consist entirely of leading
questions, and the prosecution may be founded upon the witness'
guarded responses to these questions.32 "This kind of interrogation

always creates a great risk that the witness will misunderstand the
questions or that the prosecutor will put words in the witness'
mouth."3 The same caveat may be in order when a witness is
charged with committing perjury in his or her responses to leading

questions in cross-examination. Indeed, one noted defense counsel
has asserted that "any witness will lie under repeated
cross-examination."3 At least one court has cautioned that a grand
jury witness who does not have counsel beside him or her "ought
to be given a fair opportunity to respond fully to questions and not
be limited to the 'yes' or 'no' that typifies answers to leading
35
questions."
30. MarteUano, 675 F.2d at 942.
31. United States v. Eddy, 737 F2d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 1984).
32. See infra notes 64 & 158-163 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
so-called "perjury trap."
It is a separate crime to lie to a grand jury. Peijury charges may be brought by the
government in the event false testimony is given. Prosecutors may actually hope for
peijured testimony in cases where the government has difficulty making the
underlying substantive charge.. . . If the witness is a putative defendant, there is a
high risk that a pejury count will be added to the indictment, since the prosecutor
undoubtedly will believe witnesses who testify differently than the client. . .. In a
complex case where the decision to prosecute is a close one, the government may
actually hope that the client will testify in order to give them a simpler case, i.e.,
peijury.
Sullivan, supra note 24, at 115, 123.
33. United States v. Boberg, 565 F2d 1059 (8th Cir. 1977). Of course, the same may be
said for investigatory interrogations. Regarding investigatory interrogations and interrogator's
lies, see Margaret L. Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation,3 VA J. Soc. POL'Y & L 3 (1996).
Note that the "defense" of "literal truth" (discussed infra at notes 35, 56, 90-106, 112, 119-20,
298), is available not only in pejury cases, but also in prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. section
1001. See, e.g., United States v. Milton, 8 F3d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
34.

J.W. EHRLICH, THE LOST ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 191 (1970).

35. Boberg, 565 F.2d at 1062. It is important to note that "a peijury prosecution will not
lie where the defendant is asked if he previously gave certain testimony, and he confirms
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Still, concern that the defendant might have been honestly
mistaken or misled sometimes seems to reach a level of absurdity.
In United States v. Eddy,3 6 the defendant was charged with having
given false testimony while being cross-examined during an in
camera hearing. Specifically, the United States Attorney was trying
to prove that Eddy had used an Ohio State University College of
Medicine diploma and an Ohio State University college transcript in
an effort to enlist as a doctor in the Navy 37 Here are the questions
and answers:
Q:

Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

Are you the same Terrence Allan Eddy that, on or about
March 20, 1981, contacted the Navy Medical Programs
recruiter for the Navy Recruiting District of Jacksonville,
Florida?
A: Yes, Sir.
Claiming to be a doctor graduated from the Ohio State
University School of Medicine?
No, sir.
And expressing a desire to join the Navy as a doctor?
No, sir.
And as proof or as part of your personal history
submitted a diploma from the Ohio State University
College of Medicine?

that he did . . . when a defendant accurately characterizes an earlier statement, his
testimony is literally true, even though the statement he has quoted may not be." Id. But if
the witness goes beyond a mere reiteration, but expresses his agreement with the content of
the prior testimony, then the witness is in trouble. United States v. Weissman, (unpublished
disposition) 1996 WL 742844 at *15 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 20, 1996) (emphasis added). See also
United States v. Landau, 737 F. Supp. 778, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (when the question begins with
the phrase "you've told us," the defendant is merely being asked to reiterate prior
testimony).
Back during the Watergate goings-on, a false declaration indictment against lawyer Jake
Jacobsen was dismissed on the ground that he had given an answer that was the literal
truth. He was asked by an inquiring prosecutor, "And is it your testimony that the $10,000
was the $10,000 which you put into that [safe deposit] box within a number of weeks after it
was given to you by Mr. [Robert] Lilly [an AMPI executive] and it was untouched by you
between then and the time you looked at it with the FBI agent [on Nov. 27, 1973]?" Judge
George Hart ruled that the government had not asked whether the statement was true or
false and, therefore, had no case! So it was reported in 3 WATERGATE AND THE WHITE HOUSE
134 (FAcTs ON FILE, Edward Knappman and Evan Drossman, eds., 1974). Perhaps, this is
another "reiteration case? See infra note 240.
36. 737 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1984).
37. After graduating from Viet Nam, I thought about applying to the Medical School at
Ohio State. I could not get by the Medical School's formidable receptionist. She told me that
I was too old to be considered a serious candidate. Looking back, my guess is that she was
speaking in code - no one in my family was a physician. But I believed her, and I enrolled
in law school. Needless to say, I find the Eddy case particularly amusing.

1998
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Q:
A:
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No, sir.
And official college transcript?
No.38

Eddy's argument was that he was only trying to join the Navy not necessarily as a Navy doctor! Moreover, since the diploma and
the transcript were phony, his answers were true and not false. The
diploma was not an Ohio State University diploma (not an
authentic one), but instead was a phony. The transcript was not
"official." It was fake, too. Both were "novelty items not meant to
be taken seriously."
The Sixth Circuit sided with Eddy! "Eddy's negative responses to
the prosecutor's questions were the literal truth 'in light of the
meaning that he, not his interrogator, attributed to the questions
and answers' . . . and therefore could not support a perjury
4
conviction." 39 Slippery Witness - 1; Prosecutor - 0.0
It is often opined that "many questions may lend themselves to
various interpretations 'when subjected to ingenious scrutiny after
the fact' . . . but the words used are 'to be understood in their
common sense,' not as they might be warped by sophistry or
twisted in pilpul. ...
Imaginative hindsight will not save a
defendant who has testified falsely."41 But the courts also say that
the jury is entitled to help from the prosecutor. "[T]he 'true'
paragraph [of the charge] must 'track' the false testimony";42 and
the prosecutor's questions must be precise. Indeed, since the
"intent" element of the crime requires that the witness believe that
the testimony he gives is false, the jury has to determine what the
witness understood the question to mean. The jury will be charged
to make this determination applying an objective standard (if the
standard were purely subjective, it would be virtually impossible to
obtain a conviction), but some courts have gone so far as to
recognize a defense grounded on the notion that a line of
38. Eddy, 737 F2d at 565.
39. Id. at 569. Compare the case of the perjurious dentist in Underwood, Anthology,
supra note 8, at 367-699 (dentist altered medical record to slip out of the malpractice noose,
and testified at the malpractice trial that the altered record was the original - his later
defense to a perjury charge was that by "original," he meant only that it was not a
photocopy of the altered document - it was the original of the altered version).
40. To add insult to injury, the court in Eddy gave as an additional reason for reversal
of Eddy's conviction the "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness" in the institution of the
perjury charges, since they followed his acquittal on initial criminal charges. Eddy, 737 E2d
at 571-72. But see infra notes 177, 185 and accompanying text.
41. Martellano, 675 F.2d at 942.
42. United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 847 (1st Cir. 1983).
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questioning was so "fundamentally ambiguous" as to make the
answers insufficient to support a perjury conviction as a matter of
law.4
Section 1623 lightens the prosecutor's burden of proof by
defining the crime as knowingly making two or more declarations
which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily
false. The prosecutor need not specify which of the two is false,
although the allegedly irreconcilable statements have to be set out
in the indictment. In United States v. Crisconi,4 the court held that
an indictment is subject to dismissal on motion if the allegedly
45
inconsistent declarations are not irreconcilable.

CRIMINAL INTENT

Be thou a spirit of health or goblin damn'd,
Bring with thee airs from heaven or blasts from hell,
Be thy intents wicked or charitable,
Thou comest in such a questionable shape...
William Shakespeare, Hamlet,
Act I, sc. iv., lines 40-43

Under section 1621, the old perjury statute, the government must
prove not only "knowledge " 4 of falsity, but also that the falsehood
was "willfully" stated. Falsehood resulting from mistake, confusion,
or misunderstanding, is not perjury.47 Willingness to correct a
misstatement may negate "willful intent," although willingness to
correct is not a defense as such. 8 Under section 1623, the
government must prove that the false testimony was given or the
false statement was subscribed knowingly. There is no additional
43. See discussion in United States v. Lighte, 782 F2d 367, 375 (2d Cir. 1986). See also
Weissman, (unpublished disposition) 1996 WL 742844 at *18.
44. 520 F Supp. 915, 919 (D. Del. 1981).
45. Crisconi, 520 F. Supp. at 919-20.
46. The statute does not expressly state that knowledge must be proved. Instead, the
requirement is that the witness not believe the testimony to be true. So the "knowledge
requirement" is, in a sense, an interpretation of the statutory language. See Stassi v. United
States, 401 E2d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1968). This requirement of "knowledge" does not appear to
be important in cases in which it is alleged that the defendant lied about his or her
recollection. See infra notes 88, 209-218, 271, 277-78 for discussion of additional cases.
47. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 93 (1993).
48. Beckanstin v. United States, 232 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1956).
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requirement of willfulness. 49
It is sometimes said that if a witness makes an unqualified
statement of something that he or she does not know to be true,
that this is perjury5° However, this rulette may have to be applied
in light of other statutory requirements, such as the requirement of
51
willfulness and materiality.
It is also generally stated that the witness need not know that a
statement is material, 52 and that a mistake as to materiality is no
defense.5 This brings us to the subject of materiality.
MATERIALIrY

Hamilton Burger, D.A.: Incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial!
Erie Stanley Gardner, Perry MasonM

The very cattle in the fields scoffed 55 when the infamous
Detective Mark Fuhrman was asked by F. Lee Bailey if he was
denying that he had used the "N-word" in "speaking about" black
people in the past 10 years, and the feckless Fuhrman affirmed
under oath that that was "what he was saying." Later, when he
was charged with perjury, his lawyer reportedly urged him to fight

the charge. Some suggested that if his testimony had been a lie, it
49. See, e.g., United States v. Fornaro, 894 F2d 508 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Goguen, 723 F2d 1012 (1st Cir. 1983). For a recent unpublished opinion, see United States v.
Catalano, (unpublished disposition) 1994 WL 637748 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 10, 1994).
50. See also CAL PENAL CODE § 125 ("Statement of That Which One Does Not Know to
Be True"): "An unqualified statement of that which one does not know to be true is
equivalent to a statement of that which one knows to be false." Id.
51. See People v. Agnew, 176 P.2d 724 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947). See also infra notes
86, 121, 209-18 and 156-57 for cases on false statements regarding one's state of mind or
memory.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Catalano, (unpublished disposition) 1994 WL 637748,
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 10, 1994).
53. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 523.020 (Banks-Baldwin 1994 & 1997 Cum. Supp.).
The Commentary to this section seems to indicate that the witness is required to answer all
questions, and answer them truthfully. See ROBERT LAWSON & WILLIA FORTUNE, KENTUCKY
CRIMINAL LAW, § 14.65 (1998).
54. A general objection, ineffective in most states and ineffective in the federal courts.
See generally STEVEN GOODE AND OLIN Guy WELLBORN I, COURTROOM EVIDENCE HANDBOOK 51
(2d ed. 1997). Such an objection may suffice in Kentucky! See RICHARD UNDERWOOD & GLEN
WEISSENBERGER, KENTUCKY EVIDENCE COURTROOM MANUAL 8 (1997).
55. I note, in passing, that the fact that the questioner already knows the answer to the
question is irrelevant as to whether the answer given was material. United States v. Kross, 14
F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) (perjury in a deposition).
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had not been "material." 6 That had been the position of the Los
Angeles District Attorney, Gil Garcetti. This was a bit much for the
pundits, who were quick to respond that the credibility of a
witness is ordinarily thought to be material. 5 Later, Fuhrman also
56. See generally Alan Abrahamson and Jim Newton, Fuhrman May Enter Plea in
Perjury Case, LA. TmEs, Oct. 2, 1996, at Al. When Fuhrman's trial judge accepted his "No
Contest" plea, he suggested that a charge of perjury might be hard to prove, because the law
requires that the lie be related to a "material" matter. See Michelle Caruso, Fuhrman Pleads
No Contest 7b Lying, [N.Y.] DAILY NEWS, OCT. 3, 1996, AT 8. See also Jim Newton and
Stephanie Simon, Both Sides Gain Advantages by Cutting a Deal, LA TIMES, Oct. 3, 1996, at
1A.
Question: If his only statement had been how he had addressed someone, then would
proof that he used the vile word in conversations with a professor/flm-maker establish a
case of perjury, or would he be able to get by with a "literal truth" defense? Cross-examiner
Bailey asked if Fuhrman has used the word in addressing people and in dealing with African
Americans - but he also asked questions about how Fuhrman had "spoken about black
people" and whether Fuhrman had used the word." In other words, he touched the critical
bases. See GERALD F. UELMEN, THE O.J. FILES: EVIDENTIARY ISSUES IN A TAcTIcAL CONTEXT 163

(1997). In any event, Fuhrman entered a plea of "no contest" and took a $200 dollar fine and
three years probation on the chin. See Fuhrman Gets Probationfor Lying in Simpson Trial,
COURIER-JOURNAL [LouISvILLE, Ky.], Oct. 3, 1996, at 1. The California Attorney General
immediately claimed that he had landed a knock-out blow, using the rhetorical hyperbole
characteristic of professional politicians.
57. This mantra is often recited, but what does it really mean? Dean Uelmen cites
BERNARD JEFFERSON, SYNOPSIS OF CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE LAw, section 2.19, at 277 (1985) for the
proposition that evidence of a witness' credibility is always relevant and is never collateral.
UELMEN, supra note 56, at 150. This is surely an overstatement. Compare the following
statements that have been made by courts regarding witness credibility and materiality for
purposes of the perjury statutes. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 92 P. 513 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1907) ("False testimony, circumstantially material, or supporting or giving credit to a witness,
or discrediting him with respect to the main facts in issue, is perjury.") See also United
States v. Burke, (unpublished disposition) 1986 WL 14092 (D. Mass., Nov. 26, 1986):
Although the cases have stated broadly that any false statement affecting the
credibility of a witness will generally constitute perjury, that rule cannot be used to
eliminate the materiality requirement of the statute. In all the cases cited by the
parties, statements which were found material on the issue of credibility were
statements which were in some way related to the ultimate issue being decided by
[D]efendant's allegedly perjurious statement reflects on his credibility
the court ....
at most only in a general way. The statement had nothing to do with the facts which
were central to the proceeding . . . nor did it reflect on defendant's ability to observe
the events to which he testified.
Id. (emphasis added).
For a collection of the federal cases, see Saad, supra note 24, at 872, n.78. So are matters
relating to credibility always material for purposes of the federal perjury statutes? Maybe not
always. For further discussion, see United States v. Kross, 14 F3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994). In
United States v. Adams, 870 F2d 1140, 1147-48 (6th Cir. 1989), the court opined that while
"the credibility of a witness is always at issue,. . . not every word of a witness' testimony is
invariably material. The materiality of a particular snippet of testimony is not
automaticallyestablished by the simple expedient of proving that the testimony was given."
Id. (emphasis added). But see Commonwealth v. Thurman, 691 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1985)
(defendant's statements attacking the victim's credibility were material because they had the
potential to influence the jury). See also UELMEN, supra note 56, at 167.
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took "the Fifth" when he was asked by (Law School Dean) Gerald
Uelmen whether he had comnitted perjury and planted evidence in
(gasp) - in the very case!6s Some experts opined that Fuhrman
had to plead "The Fifth" to these questions to avoid waiving the
privilege generally, 59 but the "O.J. Case" was over and the
"Fuhrman Case" had just begun. 60 Many viewers (even some
lawyers) were shocked by the law or logic (or both) that kept the
"O.J. Jurors" from hearing that Detective Fuhrman had "taken the
Fifth" when asked the question, "Did you plant or manufacture any
61
evidence in this case?"
Insofar as grand jury testimony is concerned, it is generally held
that materiality will be "broadly construed," since the grand jury's
function is investigative. 62 The test of materiality in this context is
"whether the false testimony has a natural effect or tendency to
influence, impede, or dissuade the grand jury from pursuing its
investigation."63 It has been held that the jury is not required to
make additional findings that the investigation is legitimate,64
58. Richard Seven, The Rebuttal, FormerLos Angeles Detective Mark Fuhrman Lashes
Out Against Those Who Call Him a Perjurerand a Racist, SUN-SENTINEL [FORT LAUDERDALE,
F*L, MAR 13, 1997, AT 1E; PAUL PRINGLE, Fuhrman Refuses to Answer Questions at Simpson
Trial, DALLAs MORNING NEWS, Sept. 7, 1995, at 1A; David Margolick, Simpson Detective, Back
in Court, Refuses to Reply on Role in Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 1995, at Al. For the Q&A, see
UELmEN, supra note 56, at 204.
59. Pringle, supra note 58, at 1A.
60. When Fuhrman received a $200 fine after pleading "no contest," the media outrage
was hardly surprising. One writer of a letter to the editor noted that her "terrified 78-year old
uncle" had just received 160 days community service, a $978 fine, and three years' probation,
on a shoplifting charge. How could an admitted (more or less) perjurer in a capital murder
case, and a representative of "law and order" to boot, get only a $200 fine? See Julie Ann
Hoffman, Mark Fuhrman, LA TIMES, Oct. 7, 1996, at B4. See also Editorial, Fuhrman
Plea-Bargain an Outrage That Taints Criminal Justice System, SuN-SENTMEL [FORT
LAUDERDALE, F1], Oct. 4, 1996, at 14A
61. Fuhrman was not the defendant (not technically!). For some academic criticism of
the ruling and California law on the subject, see Charles R. Nesson & Michael J. Leotta, The
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Cross-Examination,85 GEO. L J. 1627, 1653 (1997). See
also New York v. Priester, 470 N.Y.S.2d 478, 479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (suggesting that if the
prosecutor wants to use (rely upon?) testimony of a witness who pleads the Fifth out of a
claimed fear of a perjury prosecution for earlier testimony, the use of the earlier testimony
can be conditioned on a grant of immunity so that the witness can be cross-examined). Dean
Uelmen points out the irony of the prosecution being permitted to rely upon Fuhrman's
testimony in the case while opposing a grant of use immunity. See UELMEN, supra note 56, at
215.
62. United States v. Gribben, 984 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1993).
63. Carroll v. United States, 16 F2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1927). See cases collected by
Saad, supra note 24, at 870-874. See also the recent case of United States v. Danton,
(unpublished disposition) 1996 WL 729848 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 11, 1996) ("tendency to influence,
impede, or hamper the grand jury from pursuing its investigation").
64. Such a "contrived materiality" argument is really the "perjury trap argument under
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although the defendant may attempt to advance an affirmative
65
defense known as the "perjury trap"
All of this may seem simple enough, but in some jurisdictions the
concept of materiality remains a mystery in the application. A
recent Kentucky case, on appeal to Kentucky's high court, proves
the point. The case is of particular interest because it arose out of
an investigation alleging fraud in connection with the operation of
a prosecutor's office.6 While this article was in an early draft, the
prosecutor still awaited trial on charges of "conspiracy, obstruction
67
of justice, perjury, and inducing someone else to commit perjury."
Meanwhile, the Kentucky Attorney General continued to investigate
the operations of the prosecutor's office. A grand jury had been
convened, and the prosecutor's detective and secretary were called
as witnesses. She was indicted for theft for accepting state money
for working for the prosecutor in his private practice. This charge
was dismissed by the trial court on the theory that she was a
part-time government employee, and that no published guidelines
stated how many hours she had to devote to public work to earn
her government salary. Both she and the detective were also
charged with perjury for lying about the number of hours she
worked for the prosecutor on government matters as opposed to
his private practice. 6s The trial judge reasoned that they could not
a different label." See United States v. Regan, 103 E3d 1072, 1081 (2d Cir. 1997) ("perjury
trap" is an affirmative defense that does not turn on factual innocence but rather on the
existence of prosecutorial misconduct; the existence of a "perjury trap" is an issue for the
court; and defendant may not shift the burden of proof to the government or make the
"Perjury trap" a jury issue "by advancing the same argument in the guise of [contrived]
materiality"). For a similar, unsuccessful attempt to reargue the "perjury trap" under the
rubric of materiality, see United States v. Martino, (unpublished disposition) 1988 WL 41468
(E.D. Pa., Apr. 28, 1988).
65. See infra notes 158-163 for a discussion of the "perjury trap."
66. The possibility of lawyers being prosecuted for crimes associated with lying, fraud,
fraudulent billing, and the like, has become a hot topic. The possibility of mail fraud charges
alluded to in the book and movie, The Firm were reflected in life in the sorry case of
Webster Hubbell. Law journal articles are now appearing, dealing with the ethical and
criminal law consequences of fraudulent billing and other lies told to clients. See, e.g., Lisa
Lehrman, Lying To Clients, 138 U. PA. L REv. 659 (1990).
67. See Mark Chellgren, Supreme Court to Take up Question of Whether Lie to Grand
Jury Is Perjury,LEXINGTON [KY.] HERAiD-LEADER, Aug. 30, 1997, at C3; Charles Wolfe, Letcher
County Prosecutor Pleads Innocent to Charges of Corruption, COURtER-JOURNAL [LouIsILE,
KY.], June 5, 1993, at 9A (prosecutor "allegedly paid as much as $35,000 in state money to the
secretary for his [private] law firm" - she was charged with theft by unlawful taking, and he
was charged with complicity to theft). The prosecutor charged that the prosecutions were
politically motivated and designed to derail his run for reelection. Fran Ellers, Letcher's
Prosecutor,Aide Indicted, COURIER-JOURNAL [Louisvi i, KY.], May 21, 1993, at IA.
68.

LEXINGTON [KY.] HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 30, 1996, at B3.
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have committed perjury, because it turned out that there was no
underlying theft crime. The trial court reasoned that their testimony
did not relate to a crime and, therefore, could not possibly have
affected the outcome of the proceeding! 69 The court of appeals
affirmed. 70 The Assistant Attorney General who has taken the case
to the Supreme Court was understandably upset. The grand jury
investigation seemed justified, and at the time the witnesses lied,
no court had yet ruled that there was no crime. 7' If the witnesses
lied under oath in an attempt to deceive the grand jury, wasn't that
enough? 72 It would now appear that the Kentucky high court may
not have to answer the question. The prosecutor pled guilty to
suborning the perjury of a judge in an effort to cover up the
prosecutor's malpractice in a wrongful death case. As part of the
plea agreement, all charges against the secretary were dropped.73
69. But didn't the possibility exist that the testimony could have dissuaded the grand
jury from further investigations, perhaps relating to other charges against other people
involved in the operation of the prosecutor's office? Compare United States v. Vap, 852 F.2d
1249 (10th Cir. 1988). At the time of the ruling, charges were still pending in federal court
against the prosecutor.
Note that similar arguments over materiality - the time of testing the materiality of a
statement - have surfaced in the "Paula Jones case." The question is whether President
Clinton fibbed about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky in a deposition in the Jones
lawsuit. When the trial judge decided to keep out all evidence regarding Lewinsky, some
claimed that a perjury prosecution could no longer be pursued. See Editorial, Material
Statements, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1998, at C8. Others disagreed on the theory that the lie
related to a fact that was material at the time the deposition was given. The "Lewinsky
affair" (no pun intended, of course) has [Tiurned Esoteric Terms [such as perjury,
subornation, obstruction, immunity, etc.] Into Household Words, according to Joan Biskupic,
WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1998, at A17. See also Lynn Sweet, Ruling in Jones Case Backfires
Against Starr, Cm. SUN-TIMES, FEB. 1, 1998, AT 7; GAYLORD SHAW, Implications of the Law,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 23, 1998, at A28; Lyle Denniston, Probe Raises Host of Legal Questions, BALT.
SuN, Jan. 25, 1998, at 6A
70. Appeals Court Backs Letcher PerjuryRuling, COURIER-JOURNAL [LousvILLE, KY.], Mar.
30, 1996, at 12A71. Compare United States v. Stone, 429 E2d 138 (2d Cir. 1970) (materiality tested as
of the time the statement was made).
72. Compare United States v. Manfredonia, 414 F2d 760 (2d Cir. 1969) (dismissal of
case did not render perjury in case immaterial); United States v. Cohn, 452 F2d 881 (2d Cir.
1971) (false grand jury testimony material even though it related to crimes that could not be
prosecuted because the statute of limitations had run); United States v. McInnis, 601 E2d
1319, 1327 (5th Cir. 1979) (grand jury had jurisdiction to investigate conduct that might have
been a federal crime; "[a] grand jury might decide . . . that the actions were not criminal,"
but that would not defeat the prosecution for perjury); United States v. Williams, 552 F2d
226 (8th Cir. 1977) (mere possibility that violation of federal law has occurred).
73. Allen Breed, Guilty Plea Ends Case of Former Prosecutor, LEXINGTON [KY.]
HERALD-LEADER, Jan. 8, 1998, at B3. See also United States v. Craft, 105 F3d 1123 (6th Cir.
1997) (dismissing federal charges against prosecutor in connection with the fabricating and
backdating of documents filed in federal wrongful death action; indictment dismissed as
barred by statute of limitations).
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There is some disagreement over the standard of materiality to
be applied to testimony given at a deposition where perjury may be
prosecuted under section 1623. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(1) provides that questioners may seek information that is
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. Inasmuch as the questioning hounds might be "thrown off
the scent" by perjury, although the answer to the deposition
question might not in itself be admissible in evidence, some federal
appellate courts have held that, for purposes of section 1623,
materiality in a civil deposition is not limited to evidence
admissible at trial.7 4 Other courts have been more restrictive,
requiring more than "discoverability" - the false statement must
have had a tendency to affect the outcome of the underlying
75
proceeding.
Older opinions sometimes treat materiality as an issue of law for
the court, but in federal courts, materiality is now treated as an
issue that must be submitted to the jury, under instructions
requiring proof of materiality beyond a reasonable doubt.76 The
state cases are falling into line, although the issue remains open in
some jurisdictions. 7

74. United States v. Kross, 14 F3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing cases from the Fifth
Circuit). For a similar "broad" definition in a case involving perjury in a worker's
compensation case, see People v. Gillard, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (that
worker's compensation judge concluded that claimant did suffer a work-related injury did
not collaterally estop the state; perjury was still material). See also supra note 69 for
discussion of the "Lewinsky affair."
75. Id. (citing, among other cases, United States v. Adams, 870 E2d 1140 (6th Cir.
1989)).
76. The courts rely on United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) (prosecution under
18 U.S.'C. section 1001; materiality a jury question). See Saad, supra note 24, collecting lower
court cases accepting Gaudin as controlling in prosecutions pursuant to sections 1621 and
1623. See United States v. Sassanelli, 118 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Regan, 103
F.3d 1072 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Danton, (unpublished disposition) 1996 WL 729848
(E.D. Pa-, Dec. 11, 1996).
77. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 523.010(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1994 & 1997 Cum. Supp.)
("Whether a falsification is material in a given factual situation is a question of law."). Is this
statute constitutional?
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THE Two-WITNESS RULE

One witness shall not rise up against a man
for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any
sin that he sinneth;
At the mouth of two witnesses, or at the
mouth of three witnesses, shall the matter
be established.
Deuteronomy 19:15

At common law, proof of perjury required the 'testimony of two
witnesses.78 The notion seems to have been that honest witnesses
might be intimidated by the threat of "too-easy" prosecution. 79 The
"two-witness" rule has been watered down, however. In cases
brought under the "old" perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. section 1621,
what actually is needed is one witness plus some independent
corroboration (that is, the uncorroborated oath of one prosecution
witness is still insufficient).80 Most courts appear to subscribe to
the view that circumstantial evidence will do for the
corroboration. 8 ' As the Fourth Circuit has put it, the rule "is really
nothing but a short-cut way of stating that, in a perjury trial, the
evidence must consist of something more convincing than one
man's word against another's."8 2 It also has been suggested that
even this vestige of the "two-witness" rule - one witness plus
corroboration - is not required if there is "real" evidence, as
opposed to "oral" testimony. 3 Some "real" evidence may be "more
78. Actually, the two-witness rule is ancient, and proof by two witnesses was once
required in many types of cases. The Constitution provides that the crime of treason must be
proved by the testimony of two persons who directly witnessed the same "overt act." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3.
79. PROVING FEDERAL CRIMES 158 (Criminal Division of the United States Attorney for
the Southern District of New York, 1976) (citing Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 609
(1945)).
80. United States v. Weiner, 479 F2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973). See discussion in United States
v. Weissman, (unpublished disposition) 1996 WL 742844 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 20, 1996).
81. Mr. Nixon's views on the subject were mistaken. See Underwood, Anthology, supra
note 8, at 349-363.
82. United States v. Beach, 296 F2d 153, 155 (4th Cir. 1961).
83. United States v. Bergman, 354 F2d 931, 934 (2d Cir. 1966). Compare discussion in
United States v. Hogue, 42 M.J. 533 (1995) (two-witness rule applies in false-swearing offense
under Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ); but results of
urinalysis, coupled with expert testimony, sufficient to prove that defendant knowingly used
cocaine and, therefore, swore falsely to the contrary). See also United States v. Wood, 39
U.S. (14 Pet.) 430, 440-41 (1840) ("[T]his rule in its proper application, has been expanded
beyond its literal terms as cases have occurred in which proofs have been offered equivalent
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convincing than the testimony of an eyewitness and, unlike the
testimony of one witness, is not susceptible to being misused to
unduly harass or convict persons who testify in court or make
statements under oath."84
I am not so sanguine about the purity of expert and scientific
evidence. 85 But the quoted language does suggest a modem
justification for what is left of the two-witness rule as a general
rule8 6 of "one witness plus corroboration."
The two-witness rule arose in England, during the seventeenth
century. At that time, the common law courts assumed
jurisdiction over perjury cases with the abolition of the Court
of Star Chamber, which had followed the practice of the
ecclesiastical courts of requiring two witnesses. . . . The
theoretical justification for this approach was that in all other
crinminal cases, the accused could not testify, and thus one
oath for the prosecution was in any case something as against
nothing; but on a charge of perjury the accused's oath was
always in effect in evidence and thus, if one witness was
87
offered, there would be merely. . . an oath against an oath.
While the original rationale did not reflect the needs of the
modem jury trial, another reason justified its maintenance:
Since equally honest witnesses may well have differing
recollections of the same event, we cannot reject as wholly
unreasonable the notion that a conviction for perjury ought
to the end intended to be accomplished by the rule.").
84. Hogue, 42 M.J. at 537. See also Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 608 (1945).
85. See Richard H. Underwood, "X-Spurt" Witnesses, 19 Am. J. TmAL ADvoc. 343
(1995)(" 'X-Spurt' Witnesses").
86. There is an important exception for cases in which the allegedly perjurious
statement relates to the defendant's state of mind. See United States v. Nicolleti, 310 F2d 359
(7th Cir. 1962). In that case, the defendant, Nicoletti, testified that he did not recall being
interviewed by two FBI agents on May 26, 1959. This was a false statement regarding his
recollection. He remembered. See also Gebhard v. United States, 422 F2d 281, 287 (9th Cir.
1970). But how can you produce two witnesses to a person's state of mind? You can't, and
you don't have to. Proof of recollection cannot be proved by direct evidence, and must be
proved by circumstantial evidence. See also the discussion of this issue in United States v.
Chaplin, 25 E3d 1373, 1377 (7th Cir. 1994). While a perjury prosecution will lie for a false
statement of belief or state of mind - when the defendant has consciously misrepresented
his or her state of mind, we are occasionally reminded that the state of mind must be
material to the case. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, § 241.1 Commentary. See People v. Phillips,
205 P. 40 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922) (willful and false statement of belief that the witness
knows does not exist may be prosecuted as perjury); People v. Agnew, 176 P.2d 724 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
87. Chaplin, 25 F3d at 1377 (7th Cir. 1994).
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not to rest entirely on an 'oath against an oath.' The rule may
originally have stemmed from quite different reasoning, but
implicit in its evolution and continued vitality has been the
fear that innocent witnesses might be unduly harassed or
convicted in perjury prosecutions if a less stringent rule were
adopted.88
The "new" perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. section 1623, which applies
to perjury in court proceedings and grand jury proceedings,
dispenses with the "two-witness" rule entirely. The prosecutor need
only establish that two declarations were made that were
sufficiently inconsistent that one must have been false. The
prosecutor need not prove which one is false. Arguments that the
"two-witness" rule is fundamental and required by the Constitution
have been rejected.m
THE DEFENSES

Literal Truth
He [Isaac] said, "Are you really my son Esau?"
He [Jacob] answered, "I am."
Genesis 27:24
And he [Isaac] said, "Are you my son Esau?"
and he [Jacob] said, "I am your son."
Jubilees 26:19

There is nothing new under the sun, after all! In Genesis, Jacob
told a big lie "flat out," and to some early interpreters of the
Biblical text, this was sufficiently scandalous to call for some
"spin." In Jubilees, Jacob tells the "literal truth."9° He was
rehabilitated. 91
It has already been noted that falsity is an element of the modem
crime of perjury. Nevertheless, it is common for lawyers to allude
to the defense of "literal truth." The argument that a statement may
be misleading and intentionally so, but, nevertheless, literally true
and, therefore, not perjury is sometimes called the "Bronston
88. Id. at 1378.
89. United States v. Ruggiero, 472 F2d 599, 606 (2d Cir., 1973).
90. JAmEs KUGEL, THE BiBLE As rr WAS, 208-09 (1997).
91. After all, he was about to mold God's chosen into a nation state. We can't have
George Washington-type figures telling lies. And wasn't it God's plan that Jacob would fool
Isaac and triumph over Esau? A "flat out lie" just won't do.
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Defense" - after the case of Bronston v. United States. 2 But the
"lie" that is literally true has been the subject of philosophical
debate since ancient times, long before Blake penned his lines.
There is no need to digress further.93 On to the facts of the case.
Samuel Bronston's company, Bronston Productions, went into
bankruptcy. Mr. Bronston was called before the bankruptcy referee
to testify about the company's assets. It was inevitable that a
suspicious lawyer for one of the company's creditors, interested in
Bronston's accounts, as well as those of the company, would ask
the following questions. It was not inevitable that he would receive
the following answers:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr.
Bronston?
No, sir.
Have you ever?
[Dodging the question] The Company had an account
there for about six months, in Zurich.
Have you any nominees who have accounts in Swiss
banks?
No, sir.
Have you ever?
No, sir.94

While it, was true that Mr. Bronston had no personal Swiss bank
account at the time he gave his testimony, he had had one from
1959 through mid-1969. By shifting the subject to company
accounts when responding to the second question, Mr. Bronston
was able to trick the questioner into thinking that he had never had
a personal Swiss bank account at times relevant to the
proceedings. The answers to all the questions were literally true a truth told with bad intent. Ultimately the history of Bronston's
personal accounts was discovered (it usually is, sooner or later from the introductory quotes, you can see that we have this on the
very highest authority - so why do people play these games
anyway?), and Bronston was charged with perjury and convicted.
The conviction was affirmed by an appellate court, which found
that his testimony consisted of "half-truths" that amounted to lies
for purposes of 18 U.S.C. section 1621. But the Supreme Court
92. 409 U.S. 352 (2d Cir. 1973).
93. I digress on this subject in False Witness, supra note 8, at 215 and in Richard H.
Underwood, Logic and the Common Law Trial, 18 AM. J. TRAL ADvoc. 151 (1994) ("Logic").
94. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 354.
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reversed the conviction, opining that Bronston did not willfully
state a material matter that the witness did not believe to be true
- instead, the perjury prosecution was founded on what the
listener implied or deduced from his answers. Bronston would not
have succeeded in misleading the questioning attorney if the
questioning attorney had asked more probing questions. Shame on
the questioner. "The burden is on the questioner to pin the witness
down to the specific object of the questioner's inquiry."95 Bronston
"got off," but one wonders if he might have been better off being
more forthcoming in the first place. But enough of this moralizing.
The "Bronston defense" is frequently asserted, and occasionally
successful. In United States v. Larranaga,96 a subpoena sought
notes of company meetings that occurred in a given time frame.
The defendant had his secretary type up informal notes that had
been made on legal pads, napkins, and the like, and then produced
the typed version as "minutes" of the company. When he was
questioned before the grand jury, he was asked, "Question: Are
these all of the minutes of the Board of Directors or any other
subcommittees of the Board?" The witness answered in the
affirmative. Later, the witness was convicted of perjury for deleting
certain material from the typed version, and that conviction was
affirmed. But the witness was also convicted on a second count of
perjury on the theory that the original materials, the legal pads and
napkins, were "minutes." The grand jury could have taken his
answer to mean that all relevant materials that existed had been
turned over, when in fact, they had not been. Since the interrogator
could have been more careful in his questioning, and since the
witness' answer was only false by "negative implication," the
conviction could not stand under Bronston.
United States v. Reveron Martinez97 was another case in which
the defendant was convicted on multiple counts of perjury with
one count reversed on appeal under Bronston. The conviction on
this count was grounded on the following exchange:
Q:
A

Did you hear a second volley of shots?
After that, the shots stopped and there was not any more
98
shots.

The prosecutor's argument was that the witness intended his
95. Id. at 362.
96. 787 F2d 489 (10th Cir. 1986).
97. 836 F2d 684 (1st Cir. 1988).
98. Reveron Martinez, 836 F2d at 690.
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answer to be taken to mean that there was only one volley of
shots, which was false. But his answer might also have meant that
there was a second volley, but after that, "there was not any more
shots."
99
In another case, United States v. Earp, Childers, and Carrigan,
defendant Carrigan was charged with lying to a grand jury in
violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1623 when he gave the following
testimony before a federal grand jury looking into the depredations
of the Ku Klux Klan:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

How do you feel about burning crosses at the residences
of interracial couples?
I don't believe in it.
Have you ever done it, sir?
No, I haven't. 1°°

The facts were that the defendants had tried to burn a cross, but
hadn't been able to get the damned thing lit, and had been scared
away when their victim opened his door to confront them. The
prosecutor could have, and should have, asked about attempted
cross burnings, but did not. Conviction reversed!
The defense of literal truth even crops up from time to time out
in the sticks - in my own neck of the woods. In a recent case, a
former National Guard Adjutant General, Robert DeZarn, was
charged with lying under oath to Army investigators, denying that a
1991 Preakness Party was a fund-raiser (at which guard officers
allegedly passed on campaign contributions in exchange for
promotions - allegedly, noncontributors were sacked).10 1 While the
Army's hunt bagged no birds, the shooters from the United States
Attorney's office stayed out in the fields. After all, the trail might
lead to even bigger game - the alleged campaign contributions
were to benefit a (former) Governor. DeZarn was indicted (as usual
a co-defendant flipped), and the evidence offered at trial by the
prosecutor tended to show that there had been such a party, but in
1990, not 1991.102 In other words, DeZarn's denial had been the
"literal truth." As a lawyer, I naturally resent having to fall back on
a defense "on the merits," and so I was sufficiently intrigued by the
99. 812 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1987).
100. Earp, 812 F.2d at 918.
101. See Tom Loftus, Secret Tapes Put Wellman in Hot Seat, CouRmER-JouRNAL
[LouISvLE, Ky.], Sept. 26, 1996, at 1.
102. Id. See -also Jack Brammer, Lawyer Says Date Botches Guard Inquiry, LEXINGTON
[Ky.] HERALD-LEADER, Sept. 27, 1996, at B1.
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possibilities raised by the defense lawyer's "Bronston defense" that
I did some legal research to see if he actually had something. I
found United States v. Chaplin,t1° 3 a decision from the Seventh
Circuit that seems to be on point. Count Two of the indictment
charged Mr. Chaplin with perjury when he gave the following
answer to the following question:
Q:
A:

Mr. Chaplin, did you give Joseph Voss $8,000 in currency
on October 23, 1990?
I don't recall doing that, no. 104

The "no" tacked on to the end of the "I don't recall doing that" was
taken to be a categorical denial, 105 and was taken to be perjurious.
The defendant was convicted, but the conviction (on Count Two, at
least) was reversed. In addition to concluding that the government
had not provided sufficient evidence of an October 23 transaction
under the two-witness rule, here is what the Seventh Circuit said
about "literal truth":
The indictment charged Mr. Chaplin with committing perjury
when he denied giving Voss $8,000 on October 23, 1990. If, for
example, Mr. Chapman gave Voss $8,000 on October 22, 1990,
then his statement would be literally true, although perhaps
misleading. The literal truth of the statement would be a
complete defense to perjury. See Bronston v. United States,
409 U.S. 352, 360 (1973) (stating that section 1621 is not to be
invoked 'simply because a wily witness succeeds in derailing
the questioner - so long as the witness speaks the literal

truth.'). 106

Unfortunately for DeZarn, Seventh Circuit cases don't count for
much with trial court judges in the Sixth Circuit. There is a
distressing lack of full faith and credit in other judges' opinions
these days. "Gentlemen, that may be the law in [Chicago], but it [is]
103. 25 F.3d 1373 (7th Cir. 1994).
104. Chaplin, 25 F3d at 1375.
105. Compare United States v. Sanborn, (unpublished disposition) 1991 WL 21982 (6th
Cir., Feb. 20, 1991) (prosecution under 18 U.S.C. section 1623):
Q: Have you ever worked at a nightclub downtown called Chassy's even for one day?
A- I knew the owners down there. I was introduced to them and I spent some time
down there, but never as an employee.
Id. at *3 (emphasis added). Had the defendant not tacked on the italicized language, his
answers would have been nonresponsive, but literally true, and he might have relied on
Bronston.
106. Chaplin, 25 F.3d at 1380.
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not the law in Coosawhatchie. " 10 7 DeZarn was convicted, and the
case is now on appeal. As I have gotten older, I have learned not to
expect too much, especially not consistency in the application of
the law.108 In any event, one suspects that the jury did not believe
DeZarn's testimony at trial, and punished him accordingly. He
explained that the investigators asked about a 1991 party (the
investigators admitted this, and the indictment so stated), explained
that there had been two parties in 1991 that were not fund-raisers
(other witnesses agreed), and that he had, therefore, not been
thinking about the 1990 party. This last statement seems to have
enabled the prosecutor to slip into the record a newspaper article
in which DeZarn told a reporter that the 1990 party also had not
been a fund-raiser. 1°9 This made DeZarn look very slippery indeed.
The prosecutor's theory seems to have been that when the
investigators asked about 1991, they meant 1990, and that DeZarn
knew, or should have known, that - or that if he had been asked
about a 1990 party, he would have lied anyway, so what the hey!
On the other hand, he was not being tried for lying to the news
reporter, he did not say under oath that the 1990 party was not a
fund-raiser (and was not indicted for that), and he was not being
tried for lying at the perjury trial. 10 But the prosecutor's argument
carried the day. Apparently the view of the trial judge was that
107. Williams, The Criminal Lawyer in Antebellum South Carolina,56 S.C. HIST. MAG.
138, 145 (1955). In the original quote, the reference was to Philadelphia, not Chicago.
108. The DeZarn case might have political fallout, and the news accounts allude darkly
to the possibility that "others" may have engaged in improper damage control. A reversal
could bring some comfort to "others."
109. My information comes from Jack Brammer, Ex-Guard Chief Guilty of Perjury,
LEXINGTON [KY.] HERALi-LEADER, Sept. 8, 1996, at Al, A7). It reports that the statements were
made to the Courier-Journal[Louisville, Ky.] in 1992. Was the article relevant to whether
DeZarn lied to the investigators under oath, or relevant to whether he was lying at trial?
Assuming that it was relevant, was its introduction more prejudicial than probative?
Compare FED. R. EviD. 403. According to the Herald-Leader, the prosecutor argued that the
article showed that DeZarn's trial testimony was a "bald-faced lie." But again, he was not
charged with or on trial for perjury at the trial, although the jury may not have appreciated
such fine distinctions. Of course, I am relying on news accounts, and my analysis may be
flawed. Still, this is an interesting case!
110. Compare Chaplin, 25 F3d at 1380:
The government suggests that the date of the alleged transaction is not material
because, at his perjury trial, Mr. Chaplin denied he ever having given Voss $8,000. We
disagree. The question in this appeal is not whether Mr. Chaplin denied he ever lied
during his perjury trial [or worse - lied to a reporter?], but rather, whether he lied in
his bankruptcy depositions. To establish that he did lie, the government needed proof
that his answers in that bankruptcy proceeding were literally false, which necessarily
includes proving that the transaction occurred on October 23, 1990.
Id. Legal technicality? Of course! So what!
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there was an "unambiguous understanding" by all, including
DeZarn, that by "1991," the Army investigators meant "1990," and
that in the absence of "unquestionable proof" that there was a
"1991 Preakness Party having the same characteristics as the 1990
Preakness Party, the defense must fail."' This exercise in
burden-shifting is a bit worrying to me. If the burden of proving
falsity is on the prosecution, why does the defense have to prove
anything about Preakness Parties in 1991?112
Obviously, the "adversary excuse" underpinning Bronston - that
it's up to the other side to ferret out the truth - can be a hard
sell," 3 and it has its professional critics, too. A most interesting
case was brought to my attention by Professor Stephen Gillers of
New York University's Law School." 4 The case is Southern
Trenching, Inc. v. Diago,"5 a decision of an intermediate appellate
court in Florida. The plaintiff recovered a $1,087,000 judgement for
personal injuries. Thereafter, the defendant discovered that the
plaintiff had been injured in an automobile accident only three
weeks before the trial, and had suffered the "same injuries" that
had been attributed to the defendant's negligence. The trial court
denied a motion for a new trial based on fraud and newly
discovered evidence. According to the appellate court, the plaintiff
had deliberately concealed the intervening accident - "with the
knowledge and connivance of counsel." The appellate court
reversed, granted the defendant a new trial, and referred the matter
of counsel's conduct to disciplinary authorities." 6 The court was
111. See United States v. DeZarn, Memorandum and Order (denying motion to dismiss),
Cr. No. 96-5 (Apr. 2, 1996). For the proposition that a question must be evaluated in the
context in which it is advanced, see United States v. Danton, (unpublished disposition) 1996
WL 729848 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 11, 1996).
112. The trial judge may have felt that the defense of "literal truth" is available only in
cases in which the testimony under scrutiny consists of a nonresponsive answer (as in
Bronston). That is an unnecessarily grudging view of the scope of the defense. The judge
may also have viewed this as a case in which the testimony was not only responsive, but
false "in context." There are cases like United States v. Lighte, 782 E2d 367, 372-73 (2d Cir.
1986), that remind us that it is not the defendant's claimed subjective understanding that
controls nor will statements necessarily be viewed in isolation. See United States v.
Schafrick, 871 F2d 300 (2d Cir. 1989) (The trial judge cited United States v. Robbins, 997
F2d 390 (8th Cir. 1993) with particular reverence.).
113. I discussed the layman's instinctive response in Underwood, Logic, supra note 93,
at 195, where I alluded to the Aesop fable of The Two Boys and the Butcher. See THE MEDICI
AESOP (Adele Westbrook, ed. & Bernard McTigue, trans., 1989).
114.

STEmEN GIaLERs, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETIcs 413 (4th ed.

1995).
115.
116.

600 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
Southern Trenching, 600 So. 2d at 1166-67. The court indicated that it did not
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perplexed and irritated by the attitude of the trial judge. The trial
judge actually saw fit to praise the plaintiff's disingenuousness:
Plaintiff was examined by two defense experts (a medical
expert, Dr. Pratt, and a Vocational Rehabilitation expert, Dr.
Deutsch) after the April accident because, in his own words,
'They never asked me! I was told not to volunteer.' Would that
all witnesses would be so direct! (There was no testimony
from either expert concerning direct questions about accidents
either before or after November 27, 1987). Since he wasn't
asked specific questions about any other accidents or injuries,
he didn't volunteer.'

17

Fortunately there are limits to Bronston, and some witnesses are
too clever for their own good. They may be so evasive, and so
clever, that their answers appear to be completely responsive.118 A
court may conclude that there was nothing to put the questioner on
notice that there was any need for further questions, in that way
shifting what would otherwise be the questioner's burden onto the
subject of the investigation.1 9 Evasion by resort to answers that are
too artfully qualified, 120 or that are based on false claims of "I don't
remember,"' 2' may also discourage further inquiry by even the most
expect the Florida Bar to do anything about it. "[Plast experience tells us that . . . [calling
counsel's impropriety to the attention of the Florida Bar] . . .is likely an exercise infutility."
Id. at 1167 n.2.
117. Id. at 1167 n. 3.
118. This appears to have been the trial judge's view of the DeZarn scenario. The judge
cited United States v. Robbins, 997 F2d 390 (8th Cir. 1993). Eighth Circuit cases that favor
the prosecution count with trial judges in the Sixth Circuit. Robbins does not seem nearly so
close on the facts as Chaplin. Robbins was prosecuted for making a false oath in a
bankruptcy proceeding. He had been asked, under oath, about his interest in a corporation
called "llth and McArthur" when the actual name of the company was "McArthur and lth
Properties." The defendant may have even referred to the corporation earlier as "lth and
McArthur." The court reasoned that the jury could have believed beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant misled the investigator with a false name and then tried to capitalize on
this by giving literally true answers, or made an inadvertent mistake in the corporate name,
but knew full well what the prosecutor was driving at. Robbins, 997 F.2d at 394.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1989) (perjury conviction
cannot be based on a particular interpretation that the questioner places upon an answer,
but material untruth in context may establish perjury over a claim of literal truth in
isolation).
120. United States v. Sprecher, 783 F Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (lawyer defendant). See
also United States v. Abrams, 947 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1991) (prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
section 1623; "literal truth" defense available in theory, but answer that is responsive and
false on its face cannot be justified because defendant can postulate unstated premises of
question that might make his answer literally true).
121. United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y 1987). See also United States v.
Rymer, 961 F2d 1580 (6th Cir. 1992) (prosecution under 18 U.S.C. section 1623; charge based

1998

Perjury!

743

dogged inquisitor, but later, when the truth is out, invite a
prosecution for perjury. The "Bronston defense" has not had much
122
of a track record in this context.
Recantation
Touchstone:

Let us make an honorable retreat;
though not with bag and baggage,
yet with scrip and scrippage.
William Shakespeare, As You Like It,
Act II, sc. ii, lines 169-71

In the fall of 1991, Senator Arlen Specter made the following
charge:
Judge Thomas, I went through that in some detail, because
it is my legal judgment, having had some experience in perjury
prosecutions, that the testimony of Professor Hill in the
morning was flat out perjury and that she specifically changed
it in the afternoon when confronted with the possibility of
being contradicted. And if you recant during the course of the
proceeding, it's not perjury.123
The statute, section 1623(d), provides:
Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury
proceeding in which a declaration is made, the person making
the declaration admits such declaration to be false, such
admission shall bar prosecution under this section if, at the
time the admission is made, the declaration has not
substantially affected the proceeding, or it has not become
24
manifest that such falsity has or will be exposed.1
I have noted elsewhere that this particular perjury expert was
on repeated false statements to the grand jury that he could not remember statements he
made to agents; Bronston defense inapplicable). On a related issue, see United States v.
Weissman, (unpublished disposition) 1996 WL 742844 (S.D.N.Y, Dec. 20, 1996) (a conviction
may not rest on a defendant's response to a question concerning why another person acted
in a certain manner, as the question would improperly force the defendant to "speculate as
to (another's] motives"... but "a witness is entirely competent to testify to his own beliefs,
even when those beliefs concern another's intentions, and can, conceivably, do so
dishonestly.").
122. For tales from some notable cases, see Underwood, Anthology, supra note 8.
123. TIMOTHY PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNrI
CAPrTOL GAMES: CLARENcE THOMAS, ANITA Hin.
AND THE STORY OF A SUPREME Couvr NOMINATION 344-45 (1992).

124. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (emphasis added).
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wrong on two counts. 125 As I discussed above, 18 U.S.C. section
1623 allows the prosecutor to construct a primafacie case on the
inconsistency between two statements, but that statute does not
apply to Congressional hearings. What is more important, for
present purposes, is the fact that timely recantation may save a
witness under 18 U.S.C. section 1623, but it will not necessarily
save a witness under the old general perjury statute, 18 U.S.C.
section 1621. That is, recantation is not a defense under the old
"willful perjury" statute, although it may serve to negate the
necessary criminal intent.126 The weight of authority holds that the
prosecutor may pick the weapon of his or her choice and charge
the defendant under the old "general" statute to dodge the
"recantation defense." 127
It has been suggested that allowing the government to fall back
to a section 1621 prosecution "leads to the anamolous [sic] result
that a properly executed recantation under section 1623 will likely
provide all of the evidence necessary to ensure a successful
prosecution under the former statute" - a sort of "recantation
trap." 128 Perhaps there is something to this. The reader might reflect
on the facts of United States v. McAfee. 129 In this case, the
defendant was convicted of one count of willful perjury under
125. See Underwood, False Witness, supra note 8, at 248. I would say, in his defense,
that if the witness had been an assistant secretary in the bologna sandwich department,
Congresspersons or Senators of the opposing party would have called for his or her
immediate prosecution for perjury. In other words, whether or not there will be a
prosecution probably has more to do with the politics of the situation than the seriousness
of the perceived offense.
126. See United States v. McAfee, 8 F.3d 1010 (5th Cir. 1993); Beckanstin v. United
States, 232 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1956) (issue of intent resolved in favor of the defendant as a
matter of law).
127. See Thomas Campion & Kathryn Hamilton, A Review of Perjury,6 IMG. 22 (1980);
Saad, supra note 24, at 859-60. Among the leading cases are United States v. Ruggiero, 472
F2d 599 (2d Cir. 1973) and United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1973) (expressing
reservation in dicta).
128. Saad, supra note 24, at 876. Compare the dilemma of the defendant if he or she is
the subject of parallel civil proceedings. The defendant may have already testified voluntarily
or under a grant of immunity before a grand jury. The defendant may then face the risk of a
perjury prosecution if his or her testimony in a deposition is inconsistent with the prior
testimony. See Instituto Nacional v. Continental mll. Nat'l Bank, 530 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (A deponent was allowed to assert Fifth Amendment privilege! Could Monica Lewinsky
have done this?). See also United States v. Sassanelli, 118 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1997) (defendant
convicted of criminal offenses arising from his participation in a scheme to defraud others
was also convicted of perjury for statements he made in an affidavit submitted in a civil case
in which he had denied involvement in the scheme). See generally Harvey Silets,
Representing the Subject or PotentialSubject of a Criminal Investigation in a Civil Suit,
137 PLI/CRnm. 47 (1985).
129. 8 F3d 1010 (5th Cir. 1993).
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section 1621 and three counts of making irreconcilable
contradictory declarations under section 1623. McAfee, a cattle hide
processor, had been sued in two separate civil actions for his
alleged role in a stolen hides scheme. McAfee was separately
deposed in each of these cases, although they were consolidated
and ultimately settled. However, perceived perjury was referred to
the United States Attorney by one of the plaintiff's attorneys.
Section 1623(c) applies to depositions in civil cases. The three
counts against McAfee under section 1623 arose from
inconsistencies between his two separate depositions. As a defense
to one of the section 1623 counts, McAfee argued that he recanted
testimony given in his earlier deposition on the first day of his
second deposition. This defense failed because the court ruled that
the second deposition was not part of the same proceeding in
which the false statement was made - the recantation was not
sufficient under section 1623 to provide a defense to the section
1623 counts. Count 1 charged a violation of section 1621 on the
ground that the testimony in the first deposition was perjured. The
attempted (and in this case, legally ineffective) recantation, must
have helped prove the prosecutor's point.
The McAfee case provides some support for the view that section
1623(d) provides "one of the best 'traps for the unwary' yet devised
by Congress to insure the conviction of perjurers[:]"1' ° (1) There
must be an admission that one of the declarations is false; then, (2)
the retraction must be made before the proceeding has been
substantially affected; and3 1 (3) before it has become manifest that
the falsity of the testimony has been, or will be, exposed. The
courts have not interpreted any of these conditions in a way that is
the least bit "defense favorable." A virtually immediate retraction
might do, 3 2 but anything else probably will not do. Neslund claims
that "to date no reported decision reveals a defendant who has
successfully avoided a section 1623 conviction by using the
recantation provision."'3 My dips into the annotations in West's 18
130. Neslund, supra note 18, at 10-24.
131. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
132. How often will this happen, even if the witness is acting in good faith? Compare
Beckanstin v. United States, 232 F2d 1 (5th Cir. 1956), discussed at supra note 126 and
accompanying text.
133. Neslund, supra note 18, at 10-25. But compare Kristy Kennedy, 'The Case Is
Starting to Fall Apart,' Defence Lawyers Claim Victory After Judge Tosses Out Perjury
Chargefor Cruz Defendant, Cm DAmY HERALD, Jan. 22, 1998, at 1. This article reports on a
criminal probe of an alleged conspiracy by prosecutors and law enforcement officers to
convict Rolando Cruz for kidnapping, rape, and murder of a ten-year-old girl. According to
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U.S.C.A. section 1623 seem to yield support for this assertion.
McAffee illustrates the significance of the language "same or
continuous court or grand jury proceeding." But this is just the
beginning of the stinginess in construction of the statute. The
witness' admission must rise to the level of an unequivocal
repudiation of the prior testimony.TM Something less may not
suffice. 135 Fessing up to a law enforcement type may not be
enough.136 Perhaps the worst judicial day's work was the
transmutation of the word "or" preceding the final condition set
forth in section 1623 into an "and." This construction has carried
the day!137 The witness has to satisfy both of the final conditions!
If that is not enough, the courts have made it extremely difficult
39
to satisfy either. Any "action" by the prosecutor'38 or grand jury
may trigger a finding that the declaration has "substantially
affected the proceedings" before the recantation, rendering it
ineffective. In United States v. Crandall,4 0° the defendant provided
a written statement repudiating his prior grand jury testimony to
the prosecutors during the time when the grand jury was subject to
recall, this meeting the "repudiation" and "continuity" requirements.
The court even held that the written statement was the equivalent
of a repudiation before the grand jury. But the defendant's
recantation was still held to be ineffective because the grand jury
this news excerpt, a perjury charge against police Lt. James Montesano was dismissed
because during Cruz's (third) trial, he recanted earlier testimony given during a pretrial
hearing (same proceeding?). It was Lt. Montesano's change in testimony at Cruz's trial that
led to his acquittal by the judge, and launched the criminal probe into the conduct of the
prosecutors and police. Recently, the judge reversed his earlier ruling and reinstated the
perjury charge against Montesano. See Ted Gregory, Officer Hit on Perjury in Cruz Case
Again - Judge Changes His Mind About Cop's Testimony, Cm. TRia., Apr. 2, 1998, at 1.
134. United States v. Tobias, 863 E2d 685 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Spalliero, 602
F. Supp. 417 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
135. United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1985).
136. United States v. Goguen, 723 F2d 1012 (1st Cir. 1983) (witness calling up an ATF
agent and telling him that witness may have been in error in what he told grand jury did not
cut it).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Fornaro, 894 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Scrimgeor, 636 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir.
1979); United States v. Swainson, 648 E2d 657 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Denison, 508
F. Supp. 659 (D. La. 1981). What happened to the notion that criminal statutes should be
strictly construed?
138. Such as immunizing a witness. See United States v. Tucker, 495 F. Supp. 607
(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
139. The indictment of others will do, and there need be no detailed inquiry into the
grand jurors' thought processes. See United States v. Krough, 366 F. Supp. 1255 (D.D.C.
1973).
140. 363 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
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had been deprived of the truthful testimony for two months!
Furthermore, as Neslund points out, the courts have interpreted
the "manifestation" condition in a way that makes compliance
virtually impossible. As Neslund puts it, "[iut would be a rare case
indeed where a witness could testify falsely and not be aware [141]
that it may become exposed by any number of events, [142] only one
of which would have to occur to bar recantation."'" It seems to be
enough if the witness himself has reason to believe that the false
testimony "will be exposed."'" Even if we do not judge the
satisfaction of the condition from the witness' point of view, the
prosecutor will -almost always be able to contend that the perjury
145
was manifest at the time it came out of the defendant's mouth.
On the other hand, there is a sense in which this may be an
unfair or incomplete assessment. Prosecutors probably elect not to
prosecute in many cases (in most civil cases) in which the witness
has fessed up along the line. But clearly, if the prosecutor wants
the defendant badly enough, the case law (and the judge) will
14
almost certainly prove accommodating.
As an aside, let me point out another aspect of this fine mess
that Congress has gotten us (lawyers) into. By the 1990's, the ethics
pendulum had swung in the direction of "candor toward the
tribunal." Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 tells the advocate
that the duty of candor trumps the duty of confidentiality. 47 If the
141. That is, awareness to the witness. See, e.g., United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d 611,
(5th Cir. 1981) (exposure was manifest to witness before he recanted, even though the falsity
of his testimony was not yet manifest to the grand jury and even if it had not yet
substantially affected the proceedings; and the prosecutors and FBI had confronted him
before he recanted). See also United States v. Mazzei, 400 F. Supp. 17 (WD. Pa. 1975)
(following defendant's appearance, his counsel was advised by the prosecutor that he
considered the witness' testimony false and that he would seek an indictment; subsequent
efforts to make clarifying statements to FBI agents were ineffective).
142. See Neslund, supra note 18, at 10-27 n.120.
143. Id. at 10-27.
144. Id. (citing United States v. Swainson, 548 E2d 657 (6th Cir. 1977), among other
cases).
145. United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1977) (other witnesses had
already testified to a previous transaction that the witness denied had occurred); United
States v. Camporeale, 515 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1975) (prosecutors already had surveillance
photographs contradicting witness' testimony); United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 166
(D.D.C. 1974) (others had already divulged information sufficient to reveal that defendant's
version of events was a lie).
146. Is it too cynical to suggest that the statutes are given a pro-prosecution spin
because the usual target is a denizen of the world of organized crime, or a politician, or
worst of all a criminal defense lawyer? The average Joe is simply not a likely candidate for
prosecution.
147. See ABA Comm.on Ethics and Prof'l Resp., Formal Op. 87-353 (1987) (Lawyer's
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client commits perjury, and if the lawyer comes to "know" of it
"prior to the conclusion of the proceeding," the lawyer is supposed
to take "reasonable remedial measures." According to Comment 11
to the Rule, the lawyer is to "remonstrate with the client
confidentially" before doing anything rash (like attempting to
withdraw or like (yikes!) disclosing the perjury to the court). I
gather that this means that the lawyer is supposed to urge the
client to recant and "purge"'48 himself of the misdeed. That is fine
in theory. But now we are mugged by reality. The defendant is
probably not real smart, but he is probably alert enough to come to
the realization that if he recants, he will probably lose. The
significance of the lie will, in at least some cases, be blown out of
proportion. My guess is that in a capital case, the defendant will
probably not choose to "come clean." 149 If the original charges are
less serious, the advice to recant might actually verge on the
realistic, and maybe even the sensible, but for the fact that almost
no recantation will be deemed effective for purposes of the law of
perjury. Would it not make more sense to either cut defendants or
witnesses a little more slack, or rethink Rule 3.3, or both?1t 5
Other Defenses
Viola: In your denial I would find no sense;
I would not understand it.
William Shakespeare, Twelfth Night,
Act I, sc. v., lines 285-86

Responsibility With Relation to Client Perjury); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Resp.,
Formal Op. 93-376 (1993) (Lawyer's Obligation Where a Client Lies in Response to Discovery
Requests).
148. The notion that it is possible for the witness to "purge" away the consequences of
perjury seems silly, given the caselaw dealing with recantation. The notion may be traced to
confusion with the concept of disavowal and purging of indirect criminal contempt. Even
this doctrine as been watered down in the United States. That is, "purgation by oath," as it
was once called, does not bar a prosecution for contempt but only serves to mitigate
punishment. CHARLEs TORcA, WHARTON'S CuwmNA LAw 393 (14th ed. 1981). See also Sentence

Enhancement, inifra notes 324-336 and accompanying text.
149. Do defendants still talk this talk?
150. As an Ethics Chairman, I am on dangerous ground here. But after thirteen years
of listening to lawyers' true confessions and trying to "help," I probably have as much
experience with this stuff as anybody else. I think that I can safely say that I have reached
the point where I know so much about "legal ethics" that I know nothing. Such is the fate of
the expert.
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Advice of Counsel

When I get back on the street,
there's one man whose ass I'll beatMy lawyer!
Anonymous 1 '

In one widely cited case, a conviction was reversed because the
witness "had not grasped the form of the question," and was
advised by his counsel that voluntary correction of his misleading
statement was "not necessary or advisable." 152 Here, the advice of
counsel was considered important as a circumstance negating
criminal intent. Note that in some circumstances, this kind of
evidence may be rejected as contrived. Consider the case of United
States v. LeMaster,1 53 a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. section 1001.
This case arose from a much ballyhooed FBI investigation of
corruption in the Kentucky legislature. The investigation cost a lot,
generated a lot of headlines, but netted few fish. The FBI charged
legislator (and lawyer) LeMaster with extortion and interstate travel
in aid of bribery, but, in the end, all they could prove was that he
lied to an FBI agent. LeMaster had gone on a trip with a bribester,
Mr. Spurrier, 154 who was working undercover for the FBI. During
the trip, LeMaster accepted some payments, allegedly the quid pro
quo for his position on pending legislation. Here is a portion of the
FBI's interview:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

Just to make sure that we have no confusion here, did
anyone give you any cash while you were on that trip?
Give me cash?
Um huh.
No sir....
Do you acknowledge that you received this pay ..
these
payments from Spurrier?

151. When I was in law school, this "poetry" appeared in a Poetry Corner of the
A.B.A.J. I have tried unsuccessfully to find it. But I know I am not making this up. It is too
choice!
152. Beckanstin v. United States, 232 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1956).
153. 54 F.3d 1224 (6th Cir. 1995).
154. For further exploits of Mr. Spurrier, see United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466 (6th
Cir. 1997).
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No sir.15

There was little doubt that LeMaster had lied, 1' but he came up
with an explanation, of sorts. During the FBI interview, he had
consulted with State Senator Bradley, who was also a lawyer. He
attempted to get into evidence that he had gone to Senator Bradley
the day after the interview and told Bradley that he, LeMaster, had
now remembered placing bets for Spurrier, which would have
involved taking cash from him. Supposedly Bradley was willing to
corroborate that LeMaster had given him this explanation, and that
Bradley had told him that that was not the sort of thing that the
FBI was interested in. The trial judge refused to admit the
testimony of either, and LeMaster argued that this was error. He
maintained that his out-of-court statements were admissible under
the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, proved that he had
misunderstood the FBI agent's questions, and that his confusion
negated intent. He did not "knowingly and willfully" make false
statements during the interview.
The court affirmed the trial judge's ruling excluding the evidence.
LeMaster was a lawyer who presumably knew the criminal law, he
knew he was in trouble, and he had twenty-four hours to think
something up. The evidence was not within the hearsay exception.
Furthermore, what Bradley had to say reflected on Bradley's state
of mind regarding the interview, and not LeMaster's. Nice try, but
15 7

no cigar.

The "PerjuryTrap" Defense
Queen: The lady doth protest too much, methinks.
William Shakespeare, Hamlet,
Act I, sc. ii, line 240

Sometimes the claim is made that the government called the
witness - now defendant - before a grand jury or legislative body
solely for the purpose of questioning the witness in the hope of
tripping him up or creating the perjury for which the defendant
155. LeMaster, 54 F.3d at 1227.
156. The court rejected LeMaster's attempted use of the "exculpatory No" doctrine. See
discussion; infra, beginning at note 301.
157. If you think LeMaster's "defense" was contrived, compare the peculiar conduct of
another Kentucky lawyer in Prichardv. United States, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1950), conduct
that drew some acerbic comments from Judge John Noonan, Jr., in his PROFESSIONAL AND
PERSONAL RESPONSIBMIES OF THE LAWYER 122 (1997).
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could be prosecuted. This entrapment argument is sometimes
called the "perjury trap" defense. 1 It is based on the argument that
the grand jury is the prosecutor's turf, and that the witness (who is
without benefit of counsel in the grand jury room) may be led into
the pit by the wily inquisitor. 15 9 The "leading" case (the cases are
few), Brown v. United States,16° is also a very odd case. The
prosecution for false testimony before a grand jury was under the
old perjury statute, section 1621. The defendant was an IRS
supervisor who had loaned out three of his employees to assist in a
1950 investigation of alleged corruption in the office of the
Collector of Internal Revenue in St. Louis, Missouri. Apparently
some bad blood developed between the defendant and some of the
lead investigators - he had voiced his belief that the Collector had
not done wrong. But the defendant was never personally involved
in the investigation. The investigation did not bear fruit. Four years
later, the defendant was sent by a new boss on an undisclosed
special assignment to Omaha, Nebraska. When he arrived, he was
shanghaied by the FBI and a special prosecutor, who interrogated
him for two hours before a Nebraska grand jury (he was asked 365
questions, or thereabouts) about conversations that took place four
years prior. Seven answers were "taken out of context" and formed
the basis of an indictment for perjury. The defendant was
convicted, but the Eighth Circuit reversed. The court viewed the
entire exercise as a naked abuse of power. The Nebraska grand
jury essentially had no legitimate inquiry before it. It was obvious
to the court that the prosecutor had summoned the witness for the
sole purpose of indicting him for perjury. The court reasoned that
the tribunal was not "competent," and that the allegedly false
answers were not "material" to any matters legitimately before the
grand jury.1 61 A sensible result on the facts.
In subsequent cases, the "perjury trap" argument has been less
158. For a primer on the subject, see United States v. Weissman, (unpublished
disposition) 1996 WL 742844 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 20, 1996). In the context of legislative
committees, see United States v. Cross, 170 F. Supp. 303 (D.D.C. 1959) and United States v.
Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956).
159. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
160. 245 F2d 549 (8th Cir. 1957).
161. Id. at 555. The court cited United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956),
which involved similar abusive conduct by a legislative subcommittee. In Icardi, the court
opined that "ifthe committee is not pursuing a bona fide legislative purpose when it secures
the testimony of any witness, it is not acting as a 'competent' tribunal . . . extracting
testimony with a view to a perjury prosecution [is not] a valid legislative purpose." Id. at
388.
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successful, for so long as the grand jury is properly investigating
crimes that relate to the witness' testimony, it is no defense or
excuse that the prosecutor expected or even hoped for false
answers by the witness. 162 In short, defendants who have cried
"perjury trap" have, for the most part, "protested too much."16
Self-Incrimination
A witness may be compelled to testify under a grant of
immunity, 164 and the grant of immunity will apply only to past
162. See, e.g., Wheel v. Robinson, 34 Ed 60 (2d Cir. 1994) (collecting cases); United
States v. Martino, (unpublished disposition) 1988 WL 41468 (E.D. Pa, Apr. 28, 1988) (witness
was not subpoenaed for the sole or primary purpose of extracting perjured testimony). See
also United States v. Williams, 874 E2d 968 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he use of improper
prosecutorial tactics does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the prosecutor's
primary or sole intent in bringing appellants before the grand jury was to manufacture
charges rather than to investigate crime."). Former Federal Judge Walter Nixon threw the
'perjury trap" ball in the air in an unsuccessful effort to vacate his conviction for perjury
before a grand jury. The court provided us with a thorough discussion of the "perjury trap"
in Nixon v. United States, 703 F Supp. 538 (S.D. Miss. 1988). See also United States v.
Regan, 103 E3d 1072 (2d Cir. 1997) (fascinating case in which a cop was called to testify
before a grand jury investigating police misconduct; he was granted immunity, but he lied
and was convicted of perjury; "perjury trap defense" and related "contrived materiality"
arguments [that the government staged the investigation in order to elicit lies] were
rejected).
163. United States v. D'Amico, (unpublished disposition) 1987 WL 11686 (S.D.N.Y., May
27, 1987) (government asked open-ended questions, in a manner totally unlike that employed
in Brown). In Marangello v. New York, 563 F. Supp. 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), a habeas corpus
petitioner advanced a creative, but unsuccessful, theory of "contempt trap," citing the Brown
case. Compare United States v. Brown, 49 E3d 1162 (6th Cir. 1995) (federal grand jury had
authority to investigate "what might have been a federal crime," so perjury trap failed);
Gersten v. Rundle, 833 F Supp. 906 (S.D. Fla. 1993) ("perjury trap" cannot be asserted where
plaintiff had not yet testified); In ie Grand Jury (Lahey) v. United States, (unpublished
disposition), 1989 WL 123627 (9th Cir., Oct. 4, 1989) ("Mere exposure to a perjury indictment
. . . does not create an abuse of the grand jury process."). Id. at *2.
164. In United States v. Cintolo, 818 E2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987), a defense lawyer's
conviction for obstruction of justice was upheld after he continued to advise his "client" (for
the benefit of a third party) to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege even after the witness/
client had been immunized. Cintolo's lawyers and helpful amici, including lawyers for the
Massachusetts Ass'n of Criminal Defense Attorneys, advanced the proposition that "so long
as an attorney tenders a facially legitimate explanation for conduct performed in the course
of his defense of a client. . . a fact-finder must evaluate the behavior on that basis ["hidden
motivations, however corrupt, remain forever hidden"] .. . to insulate lawyers from
encroachments on the 'zealous representation' of clients accused of crime." Id. at 990. In
other words, the amici called for the creation of a defense lawyers' exception to unpleasant
criminal laws. Needless to say, the First Circuit did not endorse such a defense.
For the proposition that a lawyer may be charged with obstruction of justice when he or
she advises a witness not to testify before a grand jury, if his or her motive is to protect his
or her client as well as to safeguard the interests of the witness, see United States v. Arnold,
773 E2d 823 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. McDuffie, 1996 CCA LEXIS 251 (A.FC.M.R.
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offenses. The witness is not immune from a later perjury
prosecution if he or she lies while giving the testimony.161 Indeed,
18 U.S.C. section 6002 provides that:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other
information in a proceeding before or ancillary to (1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the
two Houses, or a committee or a subcommittee of either
House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to
the witness an order issued under this title, the witness may
not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other
information compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in any criminal
case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
1
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. 6
Still, there is some authority for the proposition that an
indictment for perjury should be quashed, or a conviction set aside,
for abuse of the grand jury process. In United States v. Doss, 67 the
defendant had already been indicted for counterfeiting and
1996); North Carolina State Bar v. Graves, 274 S.E.2d 396 (N.C.App. 1981). Compare the odd
case of United States v. Sorberra, 43 M.J. 818 (AF.C.M.R. 1996) (in which private defense
counsel advised military defendant to engage in conduct toward a witness which resulted in
the client's conviction for obstruction of justice). See also United States v. Baker, 611 E2d
964, 968 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1979) (alluding to the so-called "corrupt motive test"). What if there is
no corrupt motive and the defense lawyer advises a potential prosecution witness not to
testify? Professor Wolfram suggests that there is no problem in this event, but he cites a
version of the ABA Defense Function Standards (§ 4-4.3(b) (1980 ed.)] which has since been
changed. CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmcs 647 (1986). The Standards had relied upon
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Resp., Informal Op. 575 (1962).
For an interesting case involving the issue of disqualification of counsel, in which it
appeared that the lawyers representing certain witnesses were advising the witnesses to
"take the Fifth" to protect one of the lawyers and others, see In re Investigation Before the
February 1977 Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1977).
165. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980) (all of the immunized testimony,
whether parts of the testimony are truthful or untruthful, may be used); Glickstein v. United
States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911). See generally Neslund, supra note 18, at 10-01[7].
166. 18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (1986 & West Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
167. 545 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1976).
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narcotics offenses. The indictments were sealed, and defendant had
no knowledge of them. Defendant was summoned before the grand
jury. Although he was given Miranda warnings and had the
opportunity to consult with counsel outside of the grand jury room,
he was not told that he was already the subject of the sealed
indictments. His counsel was (of course) not present during his
questioning. He was asked about a counterfeiting transaction
similar to, and closely related to, the transactions for which he was
already under indictment. His false answer to a question was the
subject of a perjury charge, for which he was convicted. In an
opinion bristling with indignation and allusions to Star Chamber,
the Sixth Circuit reversed. The rule that emerges is that, in the
Sixth Circuit at least, "where a substantial purpose of calling an
indicted defendant before a grand jury is to question him secretly
and without counsel present without his being informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation about a crime for which he
stands already indicted, the proceeding is an abuse of process...
[and] [i]ndictments for perjurious answers given in such a
proceeding must be quashed because the proceeding itself is
void."'68
An unsuccessful variation on the self-incrimination theme, and a
take off on the "perjury trap," is the "contempt trap" - an
argument that witnesses advance to avoid testifying, 16 or to excuse
the witness' contempt. 170 So far the argument has proven to be a
loser.
Double Jeopardy
One may assert the following as a rule, and assert it with some
confidence. If defendant is tried for a crime, and defendant takes
the stand and commits perjury, and is acquitted (or for that matter,
is convicted!), then defendant may still be prosecuted for perjury
for the false testimony given in that proceeding.' 71 The logic of the
168. Doss, 545 F.2d at 552.
169. In re Grand Jury Proceedings [Lahey] v. United States, 887 F2d 1089 (9th Cir.
1989) (unpublished disposition), 1989 WL 123627 (9th Cir.,
Oct. 4, 1989).
170. Marangello v. New York, 563 F Supp. 750 (S.D.N.Y 1983). Compare the defense
posturing in the curious case of Susan McDougal on "Meet the Press," (Transcript) May 10,
1998.
171. See George Acock IH, Note, Nothing but the Truth: A Solution to the Current
Inadequacies of the FederalPerjury Statutes, 28 VAL L REv. 247, 276 (1993); Saad, supra
note 24, at 877-78 (collecting cases). Of particular interest is the case of United States v.
Fayer, 573 F2d 741 (2d Cir. 1978). The court characterized its opinion as "the last chapter of
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rule is that while defendant has the right to take the stand,
defendant has no right to commit perjury, 17 2 and any false
testimony about the past crime for which the defendant is on trial
is distinct from the commission of the underlying crime. To put it
another way, because there is no "identity" of offenses, there can
be no claim of double jeopardy or res judicata 73
Of course there are exceptions to every rule. In some states,
statutory law provides that a perjury prosecution may not be
brought when the substance of the defendant's false statement is
defendant's denial of guilt in a previous criminal trial. 74 Perhaps
these statutes are a Janus-like double bow to human nature - the
first bow in the direction of the defendant's natural instinct for
self-preservation (much like cases recognizing the now discredited
"exculpatory No" doctrine), 175 and the second bow in the direction
of the prosecutor's natural desire to get the guy who "got off."
Regarding the latter, there have been several federal decisions in
my part of the country in which the appellate panels suggested that
the prosecutions might properly have been dismissed because the
facts suggested that the indictments would not have been sought
had the defendants not been acquitted or had not successfully
appealed and overturned earlier convictions. 76 On the other hand,
the argument could be made that such suggestions were nothing
77
more than dicta.
the sad story of a lawyer whose zeal on behalf of his clients led him into areas of such
doubtful propriety that he himself was charged with complicity in his client's wrongdoing."
The clients had bribed Goodwin, an FHA appraiser, who subsequently became a cooperative
government ally with tape recorder. The clients and lawyer Fayer tried to persuade Goodwin
not to testify before an investigating grand jury, urged him to fire his lawyer and hire a
lawyer paid by Fayer's clients, and offered Goodwin a job in exchange for his cooperation.
Lawyer Fayer was charged with obstruction of justice. He successfully defended and was
acquitted, but he perjured himself in the process and was later convicted for that perjury!
172. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
173. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951).
174. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 523.070 (Banks-Baldwin 1994 & 1997 Cum. Supp.).
175. See infra note 301 and accompanying text.
176. See United States v. Eddy, 737 F2d 564, 571-72 (6th Cir. 1984), discussed supra at
notes 31, 36-40 and accompanying text; United States v. McFadyen-Snider, 590 F2d 654, 655
(6th Cir. 1979).
177. In Eddy, the court alluded to "presumed vindictiveness" as (merely) a "second
reason" for reversing the conviction. However, in United States v. Adams, 870 F2d 1140 (6th
Cir. 1989), the court spoke as if it were recognizing a new doctrine. The defendant had been
convicted of making false federal income tax returns, and for committing perjury in an
earlier sex discrimination suit against the EEOC (her employer). The appellate opinion held
that the appellant was entitled to discovery on the issue of whether the decision to
prosecute for income tax violations was retaliatory. The perjury conviction was reversed for
lack of a showing of materiality. But the court also sounded off (in language that might have
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Another exception to the general rule may arise in a case in
which a jury has acquitted the defendant in a prior criminal trial,
and the jury could not have acquitted without believing that the
defendant's testimony was true. 178 Such cases of collateral estoppel
may be rare, 179 but they do arise. For example, in United States v.
Sarno,is° the defendant was acquitted of bribing IRS agents. A
subsequent perjury indictment based on defendant's alleged perjury
at trial was dismissed since the trial judge found that the very same
issues presented in the perjury case had necessarily been
determined adverse to the Government in the bribery case. It has
been suggested that collateral estoppel might not apply, if the
government can present newly discovered evidence that was not
8
available to the prosecution at the first trial.' '
We close our discussion of double jeopardy with a note on the
remarkable Ignatow case out of Louisville, Kentucky.' 2 Mel
Ignatow murdered his girlfriend, and was acquitted of the charge.
Along the way, his girlfriend's boss, the well meaning Dr. William
Spalding, got suspicious, and sent a letter to Ignatow threatening
him with execution by a gang of Cubans if he did not confess and
tell where he had hidden the body. is3 This resulted in the good old
Doc being convicted of terroristic threatening.
Ignatow testified against Dr. Spalding, and we will return to that
testimony in a minute. Ignatow was also invited to present his side
of the story to a federal grand jury, and that would prove to be his
undoing. For in the end, the truth finally came out. Not long after
Mel beat a state murder charge (his new girlfriend, who turned
against him, and even admitted that she had been a participant in
the torture slaying, was not believed), the new owners of Mel's old
house had some carpet installed. The workmen found some of the
victim's jewelry in a floor duct, along with several rolls of
applied to the perjury charge as well as to the tax charge) that "a prosecution which would
not have been initiated but for governmental 'vindictiveness' ...
is constitutionally
impermissible." Id. at 1145.
178. For a discussion of this issue, see Note, Perjury by Defendants: The Uses of
Double Jeopardy and CollateralEstoppel, 74 HARv. L. REv. 752 (1961).
179. Saad, supra note 24, at 877, n.105, collecting cases that recognize the principle, at
least.
180. 596 F2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).
181. Sarno, 596 F.2d at 407; Teague v. Kentucky, 189 S.W. 908 (Ky. 1916); RoLuN M.
PERKINS, CRIINAL LAw 522-23 (2d ed. 1969).

182. The case was the subject of newspaper reporter Bob Hill's book, DOUBLE JEOPARDY:
OBSESSION, MURDER, AND JUSTICE DENIED (1995). See also Underwood, Anthology, supra note 8,
at 369-373.
183. I know, it sounds crazy. But as Dave Barry would say, "I'm not making this up!"
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videotape. The film showed Mel in the act of torturing and sexually
abusing the murder victim. Ignatow was charged with lying to the
FBI and to the federal grand jury, and was sentenced to eight years
in the federal pen. Complaints of "double jeopardy" were properly
rejected.
Still, Mel was looking forward to being released after a
surprisingly short time (under the new Sentencing Guidelines) his scheduled release was for Halloween, 1997.'8 4 Now a new state
prosecutor decided to try again, and initiated state perjury charges
based on Ignatow's testimony in Dr. Spalding's trial. The response
from defense lawyers was predictable - "It's double jeopardy!; The
prosecutor is being vindictive and being political!; The testimony at
the Spalding trial was not 'material!"' Time will tell whether they
"protest[ed] too much." The prosecutor intended to prove that
Ignatow lied under oath during the Spalding trial about his "good
relationship" with the victim at the time she disappeared. Here is
the testimony. Remember that Mel had already murdered his
girlfriend, Ms. Schaefer, according to his own confession. You
decide if there was perjury.
[Ignatow being cross-examined by Spalding's lawyer, Tim
McCall]:
Q: What was your relationship with her [Schaefer] on
September 24, 1988 [the day of her disappearance]? Was it
good?
A: It was good. And I loved her very much, and she loved
me. And we were engaged to be married.
Q: She had not broken up with you, nor was she going to
return jewelry to you that day? . . . It was an absolute,
good, loving relationship?
A: That's correct.
Q: You parted on good terms when you last saw her?
A: What do you mean by "parted"?[']1
Q: The last time you saw her. . . everything was fine?
A: Yes. We intended to get together the next day, and as a

matter of fact, we had made plans to do
184.

so.186

Beverly Bartlett, Ignatow to Be Freed from Prison on Halloween; Family of

Woman He Killed Fears He'll Return to Louisville, COURIER-JOURNAL [LouViLE, KY.], Sept. 27,

1997, at 1A.
185. Comment would be superfluous.
186. Kim Wessel, Ignatow Will Face Another Charge of Perjury; Woman's Killer Is Also
Indicted as Persistent Felon, COURPER-JouRNAL [LoufivILLE, Ky.], Oct. 24, 1997, at 1A.
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Could there be a better candidate for Ndstrond?
PERJURY LAW OUT N THE COUNTRY

I trust I will be forgiven for once more referring to the law of the
state of my residence. Kentucky is, happily, a relatively out of the
way place, but its law is probably "typical" of that of most
American jurisdictions. State laws adumbrated the "new" federal
perjury statute, or have tracked the changes in federal law; and as
we shall see, the proliferation of laws at the federal level, the
"net-widening," has also taken place at the state level.
Under the Kentucky Revised Statutes ("Ky. Rev. Stat.") section
523.060,187 a prosecution for perjury or false swearing requires
corroboration something more than contradiction by the
testimony of a single witness, except in the case of a prosecution
based upon inconsistent statements pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat.
section 523.060. In other words, as in the case of the federal law,
some vestige of the so-called two-witness rule remains in theory,
but a prosecutor may rely on something akin to the "new perjury
statute." Ky. Rev. Stat. section 523.050 provides, in pertinent part:
[w]hen a person has made inconsistent statements under oath,
both having been made within the period of the statute of
limitations, the prosecution may proceed by setting forth
inconsistent statements in a single charge alleging in the
alternative that one or the other was false and not believed by
the defendant. In such a case it shall not be necessary for the
prosecution to prove which statement was false but only that
one or the other was false and not believed by the defendant
to be true. lss
Like the "new" federal perjury statute, this worked a substantial
change in the law, and lightened the prosecutor's burden. As is the
case under federal law, retraction provides a defense, but the
retraction must come "before such false statement substantially
affected the proceeding and before it became manifest that its
falsity was or would be exposed." 18 9 Under prior law, mere proof of
contradictory sworn statements did not make out a sufficient
187. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 523.060 (1995).
188. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 523.070 (1995).
189. For an untimely retraction, see Price v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1987).
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case. 190 The most interesting aspect of Kentucky perjury law is set
forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. section 523.070. That statute provides that
"[n]o prosecution shall be brought under this chapter when the
substance of the defendant's false statement is his denial of guilt in
a previous criminal trial." 191 Prior to the enactment of this statute in
1974, it was understood by the Kentucky courts that a defendant
who perjured himself and secured an acquittal could still be
indicted and convicted of perjury. 192 The breadth of the defense
provided by the 1974 statute is not obvious; but one could argue
that it should be narrow. That is to say, allow the defendant to
make a false denial, but no more than that. Others would argue
that it was intended to bar post-acquittal or post-conviction
prosecutions for perjury based on any testimony by the defendant
witness. Unfortunately, there are no cases one way or the other.
Generally speaking, the authorities show little interest in
prosecuting acquitted defendants, although they sometimes go after
third parties, like alibi witnesses. In any event, whatever the scope
of immunity provided in Ky. Rev. Stat. section 523.070, it seems
consistent with prosecutorial expectations - "prosecutors say they
expect criminal defendants who are indeed guilty to lie about their
involvement in the alleged criminal activities," says the author of a
recent article in the American Bar Ass'n Journal.93 One assumes
that the expectations are the same in federal criminal cases, and
we have already noted that federal cases hold that an acquitted
defendant may be prosecuted for perjury (except in rare cases of
collateral estoppel),'9 and that a convicted defendant may get an
extra hammering under the federal sentencing guidelines. 19 5
ENFORCEMENT REVISITED

So far our review of the law of perjury has been rather sterile.
With this necessary background out of the way, we can make
things a little more interesting by addressing specific cases, and by
introducing the human element.
This article began with some observations regarding the
190. Holland v. Kentucky, 479 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1972); Kentucky v. Sesco, 132 S.W. 2d
314 (Ky. 1939); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 523.090 (1995).
191.

Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 523.070.

192. Teague v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W. 908 (Ky. 1916).
193. Curriden, supra note 3, at 72.
194. See also Joel E. Smith, Acquittal as Bar to Prosecution of Accused for Perjury
Committed at Trial, 89 AL.R. 3D 1098 (1978).,
195. See Sentence Enhancement, infra notes 324-36.
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enforcement of perjury laws. Subsequent discussions will make it
rather plain that such laws tend to be invoked ag a political
weapon or as a crime-fighting weapon of last resort ("when you
can't get 'em for anything else, get 'em on one of these"). 19 6 Many
times, the statutes are invoked to secure the "cooperation" of
witnesses 197 and secure evidence against "really bad guys." "Not so
bad guys" often get caught in the crunch.
Based on my admittedly unscientific study of the law of perjury,
I would like to venture the following propositions: (1) hypothesis
- when someone tells you "we are all in this together," they are
probably lying to you; and (2) hypothesis - when prosecutors go
hunting for whales, they often come up with very small fry.198 I
have in mind a couple of cases, the first being a series of events
that I will lump together and call "The Ivan Boesky-Michael
Milken-Drexel Burnham Lambert Fiasco."
It has been observed that "the white-collar defense lawyer's
major professional chore is information control."19 One of the more
common, if dangerous, methods of controlling information is to
gather together and represent the maximum number of people and
convince them that non-cooperation is in all of their best interests.
196.

For cases, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES: THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF A MORAL

IDEA (1987) (prosecution of Japanese politicians in the Lockheed scandal, at 669-70;
prosecution of Gulf executive, Wflliam Viglia, in Watergate spin-off, at 642; conviction of
Texas Democrat, John Dowdy, in 1970). See also Top Cult Figure Arrested in Japan, LA
TIMEs, Oct. 7, 1995, at 5, -relating how the leader of the Aum Supreme Truth cult, thought
responsible for nerve gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system, was charged with perjury in
an unrelated 1990 land deal as a way of bringing him in. There is also the matter of
over-legalizingl'ethicalizing" things. The government asks us about everything, and the
criminal law says that every answer we give, oral or written, sworn or unsworn, can get us
in trouble under the criminal law. On that point, see PETER MORGAN AND GLENN REYNOLDS, THE
APPEARANCE

OF IMPROPRIETY;

How

ETHICS

WARS HAVE UNDERMINED

AMERICAN

GOVERNMENT,

BusINEss, AND SocmY (1997).
197. My local paper included a short item about a witness (now incarcerated for
"rioting") who testified at a murder trial that he saw X shoot Y. The trial ended in a hung
jury. At the retrial of X, the witness testified that he did not see X shoot anyone. The
headline is, of course, Change in Testimony Spurs Pejury Charge, THE LEXINGTON [KY.]
HERALD-LEADER, Sept. 27, 1995, at B3.
198. Compare Dirk Johnson, A Farmer, 70, Saw No Choice; Nor Did .the Sentencing
Judge, N.Y. TIMEs, July 20, 1994 (Seventy-year-old farmer who sold $35,000 "out of trust"
under his sister-in-law's name to keep the rest of his stock from starving was sentenced to
prison for "perjury" under the unyielding Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
199. Charles Carberry, Book Review, Kenneth Mann. Defending White Collar Crime: A
Portrait of Attorneys at Work, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1985, pp.
280, 16 SETON HALL L REV. 290 (1986). See also Richard H. Underwood, Book Review, Evan
Thomas, The Man to See: Edward Bennett Williams - Ultimate Insider; Legendary Trial
Lawyer, 17 J. LEGAL PROF. 187 (1992).
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But the problem of "conflicts of interest" is apparent. 2°° "Although a
stonewall defense may keep everyone from being indicted, if
shattered, it might result in the lower-level executive facing charges
he would have been immunized from (had he pursued a different
course, and, dare I say it, "made a deal")."2 1 And the "big fish"
usually have "big time" lawyers who regularly farm out the
representation of "allied" "little fish" to smaller firms who are
dependent on such referrals. 202 Will these smaller firms protect the
interests of the "little fish" they are nominally representing? Can
they? Sometimes, when the smoke clears, there is a lot of room for
finger-pointing. Consider the case of United States v. Jones.20 3
That story began with an inquiry by federal prosecutors into
possible insider trading by Robert M. Freeman, a partner at
Goldman Sachs & Co. in connection with a 1985 takeover bid by
Princeton/Newport for Storer Communications, Inc., a cable TV
company.2 4 During this inquiry, prosecutors stumbled 'over one
William Ward Hale, who told of a stock-parking scheme to create
phony tax losses. Prosecutors "raided" Princeton/Newport, and
came up with five reels of audiotape. The tapes had apparently
been put aside, kept to "bolster contemplated, unrelated
litigation," 2 5 rather than recycled in the ordinary course. Later,
200. See generally Jay Goldberg, Multiple Representation of White Collar Targets and
Witnesses During the Grand Jury Investigation, 137 PLI/Ciuu 149 (1985). Examples of
ethically questionable tactics for "information control" are alluded to in works like KENNETH
MANN's DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRiME: A PowrRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1985). See also
Carberry,, supra note 199, in which the following observation is made regarding "hanging
together": "[S]maller defense firms may be dependent on larger firms for referrals that
generate a good portion of their income . . . Although a stonewall defense may keep
everyone from being indicted, if shattered, it might result in the lower level executive facing
charges he would otherwise have been immunized from." Id. at 290.
The "we're all in this together" strategy has been obvious in the White House's response to
the Whitewater/Jones/Lewinsky investigation. Compare Mark Miller, A Privileged Character?
The President and Joint Defense, 85 GEO. LJ. 1979 (1997) ("The Uoint defense] privilege has
been the subject of controversy among litigators and disarray in the courts. Prosecutors
generally call the privilege institutionalized obstruction or a license to conspire.. . ." (citing
Deborah Bartel, Reconceptualizing the Joint Defense Doctrine, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 871, 879
(1996)); Matthew Fosgren, Note: The Outer Edge of the Envelope: Disqualification of White
Collar Criminal Defense Lawyers Under the Joint Defense Doctrine, 78 MINN. L. REV., 1219,
1232-33 (joint defense doctrine allows defendants to shape testimony and, "coordinate
perjury"; and it can be used to keep the less culpable defendants in line by following the
"stonewall" defense).
201. Carberry,supra note 199, at 297-98.
202. Id.
203. 900 F2d 512 (2d Cir. 1990).
204. Sherry R. Sontag, Anatomy of Two Cases; RICO Had a Smashing Debut on Wall
Street, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 4, 1989, at 1.
205. Id.
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when Hale was called to testify in the case of Matter of Freeman,206
Hale testified that in the trades that he himself questioned, he had
dealt with the firm of Drexel Burnham through Bruce Newberg and
20 7
his assistant, Lisa Ann Jones.
The fishermen pursued their leads, and in 1987, they subpoenaed
Ms. Jones, compelling her to testify before a Manhattan grand jury.
Since they were interested in her superiors at Drexel Burnham, the
prosecutors immunized her from prosecution - all except for
perjury or obstruction of justice. 208 (The object was to get Newberg
through Jones and to get Milken through Newberg.) Representing
her during these grand jury proceedings were the same lawyers
who were representing Drexel Burnham in the larger probe. It
appears that federal prosecutors warned them in Jones' presence
(she had gone to pieces) that they believed she had been perjuring
herself when she testified that she could remember no
conversations about stock-parking transactions. She had said "I
don't know" or "I don't remember" or the like, at least seventy-two
times, and also denied having any recollection of having made
certain calculations of interest costs charged by Drexel to
Princeton/Newport for holding bonds - critical aspects of the
stock-parking deal. 209 As it turned out, she had been lying to protect
her boss, Bruce Lee Newberg. She also lied about her own
background - about her age and education - facts which she had
lied about to, or concealed from, her employer when she applied
for her job. What she did not know during her several grand jury
appearances was that the prosecutors had her conversations with
Princeton/Newport on tape, and that a prior grand jury witness had
already spilled the beans. It was not until prosecutors notified her
"Drexel" lawyers that they were considering seeking an indictment
against her for perjury, some three months after her grand jury
testimony, that these lawyers acknowledged her need for
210
independent counsel.
The "Drexel lawyers" referred her to Brian O'Neill. Mr. O'Neill
was a partner in a smaller firm, and at various times in the larger
206.
1987).
207.
208.
1989).
209.

Matter of Freeman, (unpublished disposition) 1987 WL 13738 (S.D.N.Y., July 9,
Id.
United States v. Jones, (unpublished disposition) 1989 WL 6668 (S.D.N.Y., June 14,
Rita Henley Jensen, How Did Lisa Ann Jones Get Caught in the Vortex...

NAT'L L.J.,
SEPT.4, 1989, AT 1.

210.

Compare ABA RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucT.

?,

1998

Perjury!

inquiry, O'Neill represented five other Drexel employees.2" Now, it
is a possibility that Ms. Jones had not "simply lied." She may have
had some psychological problems, a "dissociative disorder" on
account of her abuse as a child. A psychiatrist offered this
suggestion in an article in The National Law Journal.2 2 But this
possibility was not exploited by Mr. O'Neill. His strategy throughout
was that she had testified honestly before the grand jury
proceedings in every instance in which she said "she could not
remember" something. This was not an ideal strategy, if for no
other reason than the fact that Mr. O'Neill at one point had dictated
and sent a letter, without going over it with his client (this fact was
in dispute), that she "now remembered" having conversations
similar to those that she denied when she was before the grand
jury.
At Ms. Jones' trial for perjury (for making false declarations
before a grand jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1623, and for
obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. section 1503213), the
prosecutor began his cross-examination by getting her to again
deny having had the critical conversations admitted to in the letter
that had been sent by O'Neill. When Ms. Jones answered, "I don't
know," to questions about such "similar conversations," her case
went down the drain. The prosecutor now suggested that there
might be more charges against Ms. Jones, and even put -the heat on
Mr. O'Neill - the prosecutor alluded darkly to the lawyer's
professional responsibility to prevent perjury!21 4 Experts hired by
Ms. Jones would later argue that this gave Mr. O'Neill the incentive
to protect himself rather than the client - by skirting a defense
based on Jones' consistent loss of memory and mental confusion
("dissociative disorder") in favor of wishful thinking (the hope that
he could keep the recantation letter out of evidence). 215 The
prosecutor then moved on to Jones' lies about her past, bad facts
that could have been admitted on her direct examination for the
purpose of "removing the sting" of anticipated cross-examination. 216
Here is what happened:
211. Jensen, Vortex. . . ?, supra note 209, at 1.
212. Id. I should state, at this juncture, that both the psychiatrist and I may be
engaging in "Monday morning quarterbacking."
213. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1502 (1986 & West Supp. 1998).
214. See infra notes 240-256 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue. See
also United States v. Jones, 900 F2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1990).
215. Id. Among the experts was Geoffrey Hazard, the reporter for the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.
216. Basic, dare I say it, "law school" stuff.
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Did you ever enroll in California State University at
Northridge?
I don't remember.
Are you telling us that when you told the grand jury that
you went to California State University at Northridge, you
honestly believed that you had gone there?
Yes.
What was it that made you believe that you had gone to
California State University at Northridge.
217
I don't know.

If Mr. O'Neill had had a "shrink" on deck, he might have argued
that this testimony was prima facie evidence that Ms. Jones was
out of her mind. The testimony was that bizarre. But he called no
"memory expert" or "psychiatrist." Ms. Jones' goose was cooked.
She must have been lying when she told the grand jury that she
"could not remember" the conversations that were on the tapes
that were now in evidence, for all to hear.2 18 She was convicted,
and ended up getting more time than Mr. Newberg, 21 9 even after a
post-appeal reduction in her sentence!220 And although Mr. Milken
got more time, he also came away with much of his ill-gotten gains
- some would say that "crime did pay" for him. Her appeal
alleging conflict of interest was given short shrift. 221 The appeals
court did not find the alleged conduct sufficiently compelling or
concrete. In the end, all counsel were in the clear. Still, a scary
scenario, and a valuable cautionary tale.
I end our discussion of the basics with a curious and sordid tale
- a long way (perhaps not such a long way, geographically) from
Wall Street - arising out of the Brooklyn D.A.'s pursuit of one Eric
Jackson (a.k.a. "Eric Knight" and "Eric Jackson-Knight"), for arson
and related murder arising from a 1978 supermarket fire that took
the lives of six firefighters, and a 1991 rape and murder of a
pregnant, homeless woman who lived in an abandoned concession
217. Jones, 1989 WL 66668 at *6.
218. Jensen, Vortex. . . ?, supra note 209, at 1.
219. Rita Henley Jensen, Payment Susupendedfor Lisa Jones, NAT'L LJ., June 24, 1991,
at 40. Two months after Jones was jailed, Drexel stopped payments to Jones' attorneys
(O'Neill's replacements), although they had explicitly agreed to shoulder the costs of her
defense.
220. Rita Henley Jensen, Securities Actions, NAT'L LJ., July 22, 1991, at 6. Jones was
the only Drexel employee, other than Michael Milken, to be jailed in connection with the
investigation.
221. United States v. Jones, 900 F2d 512 (2d Cir. 1990).
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stand at Coney Island.
The prosecutor's quest led to a somewhat unsatisfying end - the
perjury conviction of the unwilling and mercurial prosecution
witness, Christine Moroney, who had originally identified
Jackson-Knight as the killer of her Coney Island "roommate," Linda
Casella. On November 30, 1991, Ms. Moroney returned to their digs
after an appointment for her methadone treatment. "When she saw
a man having sex with her friend (the very pregnant Ms. Casella),
she walked away, she said; when she returned, the man emerged
wearing a blood-stained shirt. Ms. Casella [had been] beaten and
strangled." 222 Maroney claimed that she chased the man down Surf
Avenue before he doubled on her and scared her off. She identified
Eric Jackson-Knight in a police line-up. Jackson-Knight was
arrested while in court, attending a hearing relating to his retrial
for the supermarket arson-fire. His conviction in an earlier trial had
been set aside in 1988 by a judge who found misconduct in the
prosecutor's failure to turn over notes indicating a possible
accidental origin for the fire. 223 Then, too, there was the nagging
detail that the firefighters' survivors had recovered $13.5 million
from the store chain, based on the evidence of a retired arson
detective who concluded that the fire probably resulted from faulty
224
wiring.
The authorities had to contend with some "bad facts" in the new
rape-murder charge, too. The DNA results from semen in the
victim's body did not match Mr. Jackson-Knight. But the
prosecution was not deterred; prosecutors came up with an odd
witness and a disgusting theory. A prostitute testified that
Jackson-Knight bought used condoms from her and may have
225
smeared one on his victim!
At this point, the drug-addicted Ms. Moroney became
uncooperative. "House arrest" was not working out to her
satisfaction. On her way to court, she yelled to passers-by,
222. Jan Hoffman, Murder Eyewitness Convicted Over 'Memory Loss,' N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
30, 1994, at Y13.
223. Id.; Jan Hoffman, Two Trials Later, Mystery Lingers Over Arson Case, N.Y. TIms,
Aug. 21, 1994, at 45.
224. Hoffman, Mystery Lingers, supra note 223, at 45.
225. Id. It sounds like something a law professor would think of. Compare Richard
Lempert, Some Caveats ConcerningDNA as CriminalIdentification Evidence: With Thanks
to the Reverend Bayes, 13 CARDozo L REV. 303, 341, n.34 (1991) (use of DNA evidence might
result in the release of the guilty in some bizarre scenarios, e.g., a woman might have
unprotected consensual sex, and then be raped by a considerate rapist who wore a condom).
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"Everyone come to see the show! I'm going to let him go!"22 6 In the
end, she testified under oath before the trial judge, without a jury
present, that she did not remember the events of the crime, that
she had chased a dog away from her abode, and that she did not
recognize Eric Jackson-Knight. The prosecutor attempted to dismiss
the case, but the trial judge sent the case to the jury anyway,
without any testimony from Ms. Moroney. Jackson-Knight was
acquitted. The jurors were interviewed, and at least some said that
they thought he was guilty - but they would have needed more
227
evidence to convict.
The prosecutor went ballistic and charged Ms. Moroney with
perjury. After deliberating two-and-a-half days, the jury found her
guilty on two of six counts of perjury. Meanwhile, Jackson-Knight
228
was acquitted in a retrial of the arson-murder of the firefighters,
and at last report was the proud owner of a "multi-million-dollar
lawsuit for wrongful imprisonment and malicious prosecution," but
some still harbored the suspicion that Jackson-Knight may have
229
been guilty and may have beaten the system.
As for Ms. Moroney - her conviction was set aside on the
ground that the prosecution had treated her unfairly. Apparently,
the judge believed Ms. Moroney's claims that she had been abused
and "held prisoner" to get her to "put an innocent man in jail."230
Indeed, she claimed that the police withheld medication from her,
beat her, and threatened to kill her if she refused to testify "their
way."2-1 The prosecution - formerly the hunter - became the
hunted. Critics contended that prosecutors had not been deflected
by the DNA results because they were out to get Jackson-Knight. It
was suggested that the prosecutors had been too ready to deal with
a convict by the name of Julio Cruz, who was the one who claimed
that Jackson-Knight had confessed to him regarding the
arson-murder. Mr. Cruz's reward was a deal - he was "sprung"
from his prison cell. The New York Times reported that after his
release, Cruz killed his girlfriend's two-year-old son "by smashing
him on the dashboard of a car. He threw the body into a
226. Lempert, supra note 225, at 341, n.34.
227. Id.
228. His original conviction was reversed, in part, because the prosecution
disclosed information that might have been helpful to the defense. See Hoffman,
Lingers, supra note 223, at 45.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 15, section 4. Compare the tactics in the "Fatty Arbuckle"
Underwood, Anthology, supra note 8, at 344-49.
231. Patricia Hurtado, Homeless Perjury Tial, NEWSDAY, Jan. 25, 1994, City at

had not
Mystery

case in
86.
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dumpster." Cruz plea-bargained, served six years, and at last report,
was working as a paralegal! 2 2 0 tempore! 0 mores!
WIDENING THE NET

Duke: We have strict statutes and most biting laws.
William Shakespeare, Measure for
Measure, Act I, sc. iii, line 19

Here are some of our "most biting laws."
Section 1622. Subornation of perjury.
Whoever procures another to commit any perjury is guilty of
subornation of perjury, and shall be fined not more than
$2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.2
Section 1001. Statements or entries generally.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in
any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative
or judicial branch of the Government of the United States,
knowingly and willfully (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme,
or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statements or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing
the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial
proceeding, or that party's counsel, for statements,
representations, writings- or documents submitted by such
party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding.
(c) With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the
legislative branch, subsection (a) shall apply only to (1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment,
a matter related to the procurement of property or
services, personnel or employment practices, or support
232.
233.

Hoffman, Mystery Lingers, supra note 223, at 15, section 4.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1622 (1986 & West Supp. 1998).
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services, or a document required by law, rule, or
regulation to be submitted to the Congress or any office
or officer within the legislative branch; or
(2) any investigaton or review, conducted pursuant to the
authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or
office of the Congress, consistent with applicable rules of
the House or Senate.2
Section 1512. Tampering with a witness, victim, or an
informant...
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force,
threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts
to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another
person, with intent to (1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any
person in an official proceeding;
(2) cause or induce any person to (A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record,
document, or other object, from an official proceeding;
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with
intent to impair the object's identity or availability for
use in an official proceeding;
(C) evade legal process summoning that person to
appear as a witness, or to produce a record, document,
or other object, in an official proceeding; or
(D) be absent from an official proceeding to which
such person has been summoned by legal process; or
.*. shall be fined by not more than $250,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both...
234. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (1986 & West Supp. 1998). This section was totally revised by
Pub. L. 104-292, § 2, 110 Stat. 3459 (Oct. 11, 1996). Prior to several small amendments during
the 1980's and early 1990's, section 1001 provided:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States, knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1948, as amended).
According to statements in The CongressionalRecord, Congress reacted quickly to restore
the status quo following the Court's decision in Hubbard (decriminalized false statements to
both Congress and the judiciary). See 142 CONG. REc. S11005-08 (1996 WL 565642). See also
infra note 296.
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(d) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, it is an
affirmative defense, as to which the defendant has the burden
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conduct
consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant's
sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other
235
person to testify truthfully.
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY

Desdemona: But now I find I had suborned the witness,
And he's indicted falsely.
William Shakespeare, Othello,
Act III, sc. iv, lines 152-153
Perjury; is that a moral wrong or something? You got a problem with
that? . .. Does this go back to religious upbringing or something?...
Now, honesty'll get you in a world of s**t sometimes ...
Just
remember something. Self-preservation: number one. You take care of
you and the best way to do that is - you stay the f**k out of this as far
away from it as you can. And if that means you got to tell a goddam
little lie, you slap your hand right up to that Good Book and lie like a
son-of-a-bitch. And don't worry about it because, honey, there ain't
enough room in hell for all the perjuring bastards in this world.23

Mr. Cummins had not a high regard for the truth. Perhaps when
he goes to his ultimate reward, he will be proved wrong once
again, and find some friends in Ndstrond. In any event, the lesson
is that getting others to perjure themselves is bad - real bad.
Cummins was convicted of subornation of perjury, and his appeal
27
was denied. 3
The common law punished those who procured the making of
false statements - those who intentionally caused perjury to be
committed by another.m This procuring, instigating, or soliciting of
perjury is commonly referred to as "subornation of perjury." Proof
of guilt required the conviction of the perjurer as well as proof that
the party charged with subornation knew or should have known
235. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512 (1986 & West Supp. 1998).
236. United States v. Cummins, 969 F2d 223 (6th Cir. 1992). In other contexts,
numerous modem philosophers, luminaries, and literati have harbored doubts as to the
rewards of truth-telling. Consider the following exchange between the alleged artist, Gennifer
Flowers, and writer Andrew Ferguson reported in ANDREW FERGUSON, FOOL'S NAMES, FOOL'S
FACES (1997): Flowers: "I'll tell you ... whoever said, 'The truth will set you free' was full of
s***." Ferguson replied, "I think that was Jesus."
237. Cummins, 969 F.2d at 228.
238. See discussion in Underwood, False Witness, supra note 8, at 239-44.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 36:715

that his or her conduct would bring about perjury.239
A recent federal disciplinary case from the Eighth Circuit
documents a particularly sorry scenario of alleged subornation by a
lawyer.240 The lawyer represented a woman in a divorce and
custody battle. The lawyer was surprised when his client's husband
called a witness who testified that he, the witness, had had sex
with the client/wife in a motel room in the presence of the couple's
child. The lawyer obtained a recess and confronted his client in the
empty courtroom. Alas, there were cameras and sound recording
on this courtroom, and the court reporter had left everything
running. Here is what transpired and was preserved for the benefit
239. See United States v. Standifer, 40 M.J. 440 (1994) (elements of crime of
subornation of perjury under the UCMJ, quoting the MANUAL FOR COUR'S-MARTl, UNITED
STATES (1984)). In this interesting case, the defendant had solicited a potential exculpatory
witness to testify falsely but did not call the witness to the stand. The prosecution then
called her, elicited perjured testimony that was consistent with defendant's testimony as to
his innocence, and then argued that she and defendant had concocted a bogus story. While
the court made it clear that the party accused of subornation need not call the witness who
falsely testifies to the stand if he intends that the testimony get into the case (and thereby
mislead the court and corrupt the judicial process), the court ruled that, in this case, the
defendant not only did not call the witness to the stand, but also had no reason to believe
that the prosecution would call her to the stand. Under these circumstances, the defendant
could not be held accountable. "To hold otherwise would create the irony of upholding a
conviction of an accused for subornation of perjury in a given case even if the accused
decides to forgo calling his own witness to prevent possible perjury." Id. at 445. See
generally William Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BRooKLYN L REv. 781 (1988).
240. In re Attorney Discipline Matter, 98 F 3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1996). Reported opinions
involving charges of subornation against lawyers are hard to find, but they are out there. For
an interesting case in which a lawyer was convicted of subornation, but the conviction was
later reversed on the ground that the lawyer was prejudiced by a joint trial (that his motion
to sever in the trial court should have been granted), see United States v. Echeles, 352 F2d
892 (7th Cir, 1965). For federal cases imposing money sanctions on lawyers for suborning
perjury, see Mackler Productions, Inc. v. Turtle Bay Apparel Corp., (unpublished disposition)
1997 WL 269505 (S.D.N.Y, May 21, 1997); Tedesco v. Mishkin, 629 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
The Mackler opinion is particularly interesting. It involved a civil action to recover
payment for goods that had been sold and delivered. After a trial, the judge awarded plaintiff
compensatory and punitive damages, the punitive damages based on the theory that
defendants had deliberately "stiffed" the plaintiff and had acted fraudulently and in bad faith.
These damage awards were affirmed on appeal. See 47 E3d 1158 (2d Cir. 1995). What got
defense counsel in trouble was the testimony of one of his witnesses, a Ronald Hoffman,
who testified that the signature "C. Hoffman" on a critical document was his own signature.
It was actually the signature of a Cindy Hoffman, who was an employee of plaintiff. Mr.
Hoffman was quickly caught in the lie by opposing counsel and the trial judge. He reiterated
his testimony even after being warned of the penalties for perjury, but was nailed when he
was forced to produce his driver's license - the signatures did not match. The judge
referred the matter to the United States Attorney. Hoffman later pled guilty to perjury, and in
the process, turned on counsel, claiming that he had told him to lie. After a hearing on the
sanctions motion, the trial judge believed Hoffman's story and rejected counsel's
explanations.
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2 41
of the prosecutor and bar counsel:

Lawyer. What about the business about the [motel]? Did that
happen?
Client:
Yeah, it happened.
Lawyer: God-damn. What were you thinking about?
Client:
She was only three months - I mean eighteen
months. I couldn't leave him. I don't know. I don't
know.
Lawyer: You better deny this. Eighteen months old, Jesus.
Client:
Well, she wasn't even eighteen months in '86. She
was a little bitty baby. She was still in diapers. She
was born in '85, in '84, December of '84. In '85 she
was about a year, but I was not seeing him in '86
because right after the court date, right after my
court date, me and [ ] were still talking, and I did
see him then.
Lawyer: So that didn't happen in October of '86?
Client:
No, it wouldn't have been October.
Lawyer: You better deny this, buddy. You better deny it.
Lawyer: The thing that hurts you is taking the kid in the
room and s****ing with the kid in the room. He said
that you two had sex in the bed next to your kid,
your little kid was in the other bed. You're going to
have to do something with it.
Client:
What can I do with it that won't make it look like
I'm lying?
Lawyer: I don't know. That's up to you. It could be your
word against his. It's up to you.
Client:
Are you saying that if I deny it then...
Lawyer If you said it didn't happen, it didn't happen.
Client:
I remember it happening in '86. It seemed to me that
she was in diapers. She was little. I've left him so
many different times, except the first time I filed
was in '85, right?
Lawyer. Yeah, but think of your judgment ... [etc.] ...
Client:
Well, she was little . . . [etc.] ...
Lawyer. Well, what are you going to do about that? Are you
241. Attorney Discipline, 47 F3d at 1084-85. What about secret tape recording and
attorney-client privilege? The opinion does not address these matters, but one assumes that
any protests along these lines would have been raised in the lawyer's criminal trial and in his
disciplinary proceedings, and that they must have been resolved against him under state law.
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going to deny that or what?
I don't know.
Well, it's up to you. It's up to you. Well, you['re]
telling the truth when you say it didn't happen in '86.
Okay.
I don't remember it happening in '86, no.
This guy crucifies you.
I know.

After the recess, the testimony went like this:
Lawyer. Okay. Now, in 1986, why ... what would possess
him to tell that you went to a motel with him, with
your daughter?
Client:
I don't know.
Lawyer: Did you think he was your friend?
Client:
Yes.
Lawyer: What was the situation with him when you met [ ]
when you were separated? Were you going out with
[him]?
Client:
No, I wasn't.
Lawyer: You dumped him for [ ]?
Client:
No, I wasn't dating anyone.
Lawyer: You weren't dating anyone.
Client:
No.
Lawyer: Do you ever ...
under oath now, do you ever
remember going to a motel with your daughter with
[him]? (emphasis added).
Client:
No.
Lawyer: That's a lie, isn't it? ["It" being what the adverse
witness had previously testified to?]
Client:
Yes.
Lawyer: What would possess him to tell that?
Client:
I don't know...
Moving to cross-examination:
Counsel:
Lawyer:
Counsel:

So everything he said today was just fabricated...
Objection, some of it wasn't fabricated. The motel
incident she said was fabricated.
Everything relating to a sexual nature after 1984
was fabricated, correct?
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Yes. 242

The lawyer was charged in Illinois with perjury and subornation
of perjury, but was acquitted following a bench trial. The Illinois
trial judge reasoned that the critical question was "do you ever...
under oath now, do you ever remember going to a motel with your
daughter with [the adverse witness the client had sex with]"; and
that "[tlhe question [was] prefaced as a test of memory, not as a
test of whether something happened or did not happen?"
Presumably, the judge was thinking in terms of literal truth, and
determined that the client truthfully did not remember. But in
Illinois, an acquittal in a criminal case does not bar a subsequent
disciplinary action based on the same facts - the burden of proof
is different, and the purposes of the criminal and disciplinary
actions are different. Disciplinary tribunals in Illinois, and in
Missouri, were not bound by the criminal action, and could
consider the lawyer's intent when he asked his client if she
remembered going to a motel with the man. Both Illinois and
Missouri authorities imposed discipline. The Supreme Court of
Missouri disbarred the lawyer, finding that "the [lawyer's] question
and [the client's] answer were designed to prove that [the client]
had never been to a motel with her daughter and [the adverse
witness]. From his recess consultation, [the lawyer] knew this was
not true."214 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri did the same and disbarred the lawyer in
Federal Court. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
The published opinion in Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Wheeler2 "
recites a troubling set of facts leading up to a one-year suspension
of a lawyer from practice. 45 Lawyer Wheeler's clients, the Bilbreys,
were local distributors of marijuana. One Sammy Richeile was
busted by state police detectives with two pounds of the stuff in
his possession. He told the cops that he had been to the Bilbrey
property, where he had swiped the dope. He signed an affidavit to
that effect, which the police used to get a search warrant for the
Bilbrey property. Another seven pounds of the stuff was recovered
in the search. Lawyer Wheeler met with Sammy - and Sammy had
been "wired." All of the conversations between the lawyer and the
242. Id.
243. In re Storment, 873 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Mo. 1994).
244. 808 S.W.2d 803 (1991).
245. Note that in some states lawyers have been suspended for one year for
non-criminal conduct such as failing to file a lawsuit before the expiration of the statute of
limitations.
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witness were being recorded for the benefit of law enforcement.
According to the published opinion:
[Wheeler] told Rochelle that it would be worth untold sums to
the Bilbreys if Rochelle would not admit going to the Bilbrey's
residence, and if he would sign an Affidavit that his original
Affidavit in support of the search warrant was incorrect.
[Wheeler] told Rochelle he would have Jim Bilbrey contact
him and that [Wheeler] did not want to know anything [6]
about their discussion. At no time did Rochelle advise
[Wheeler] that the Affidavit he had executed in support of the
247
search warrant was based on false information.
The clients then met with and suborned the witness, a new
affidavit was prepared, and the rest was indictments, if not history.
The clients were convicted of bribery, but what of lawyer Wheeler?
Wheeler was indicted for complicity in bribery, for perjury in the
first degree by complicity, and for criminal solicitation to commit
perjury. According to the reported opinion, "the Commonwealth
Attorney did not believe he could obtain a conviction" of the
lawyer. However, a subsequent newspaper account of the case
indicates that the prosecutor thought he had a great case, but that
the circuit judge "dismissed the indictment after concluding that
Wheeler's [the lawyer's] culpability was 'very small' compared with
the Bilbreys' [the clients']." 248 Again, quoting the judge, "Wheeler is
a young attorney in the process of trying to establish a law
practice, whereas the Bilbreys are charged with having in their
possession great quantities of marijuana."249 My advice to all
lawyers is that they should assume that their conversations are
being recorded, 25° and that they are probably not going to draw a
246. In his article on "defensive" lawyering (see infra note 250, at 336 n.30),
attorney-author John Wesley Hall, Jr. alludes to the federal pattern jury instruction on
criminal knowledge set forth in 1 EDWARD DEvrrm & CHARLES BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE
AND INSTRUCTIONS § 14.09 (3d ed. 1977): "The element of knowledge may be satisfied by
inferences drawn from proof that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would
otherwise have been obvious to him. A finding beyond a reasonable doubt of a conscious
purpose to avoid enlightenment would permit an inference of knowledge. Stated another
way, a defendant's knowledge of a fact may be inferred from willful blindness to the
existence of the fact. . . ." Id.
247. Wheeler, 808 S.W2d at 804.
248. R.G. Dunlop, Justice on Trial; Attorney's Attempt to Supress Evidence Brought
Only Suspension, THE COURIER-JOURNAL [LousVILLE, Ky.], June 4, 1995, at A17.

249. Id.
250. In Defensive Defense Lawyering or Defending the CriminalDefense Lawyer from
the Client, John Wesley Hall, Jr., offers the following advice for staying out of trouble: "Say
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judge who draws such fine distinctions.
THE NEW "WITNESS TAMPERING" LAW

More recent legislative changes widening the net, or expanding
the "field of fire" in terms of punishable conduct and "hostile"
personnel, include 18 U.S.C. section 1957251 (which makes it a
felony for anyone to knowingly engage in a financial transaction
with knowledge that the property involved is derived from crime),
26 U.S.C. section 60501252 (which mandates the reporting of cash
payments for services if they equal or exceed certain limits), and 18
U.S.C. section 1512(b) 25 (particularly the language defining
obstruction of justice as including "misleading conduct" engaged in
with intent to influence witness testimony). 254 While these new laws
were promoted as weapons aimed at "gangster" types - thugs,
drug dealers, and money launderers - they are not in the least bit
*discriminatory on their face. They are about as surgical as a
claymore mine.2 5 Criminal defense lawyers are definitely in the
nothing or do nothing that you would be afraid or ashamed to read in the newspaper some
day. Stated more bluntly, if the police or a grand jury listened to this conversation, what
would they think?." 11 U. ARK L REv. 329, 330-31 (1988-89) (emphasis in original omitted).
See also Bennett Gershman, The New Prosecutors,53 U. Prrr. L REv. 393, 403 (1992). See also
Michael Higgins, Fine Line, ABAJ, May 1998, at 58 ("Would I be troubled if this were to be
revealed in discovery?" - the practical test imposed by a law school dean).
Again, the criminal defense lawyer might as well assume that he or she is being taped! In
addition to the many examples of taping provided in this article, see, e.g., United States v.
Marrapese, 826 F2d 145 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The witness contacted the government and was
outfitted with a body tape recorder to wear to a meeting with Marrapese at Marrapese's
lawyer's office.. .. The government subsequently charged Marrapese, his lawyer, and a third
person ... with conspiracy to suborn perjury...."). Id. at 146.
251. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957 (1986).
252. 26 U.S.C.A. § 60501 (1986 & West Supp. 1998).
253. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(b) (1986 & West Supp. 1998).
254. For a recent discussion of section 1512 and related statutes, see Alicia Dixon,
Robert Kwak, & Catherine Morris, Obstruction of Justice, 34 An CRIM. L REv. 815 (1997).
Such statutes widen the net in a variety of ways. Note in this regard that perjury may
obstruct justice, but the cases hold that perjury does not necessarily obstruct justice. See In
re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1945); United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1969).
"A prerequisite to a conviction [for obstruction of justice] based solely on false testimony
...
is that the government must charge in the indictment and prove at trial that the
testimony had the effect of impeding justice." United States v. Martino, (unpublished
disposition) 1988 WL 41468 (E.D. Pa., Apr. 28, 1988).
255. In the course of imposing sanctions on a lawyer in a civil case, the trial judge
alluded darkly to possible violations of 18 U.S.C. sections 1503 and 1512. Clark Equip. Co. v.
Lift Parts Mfg. Co., (unpublished disposition) 1987 WL 19150 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 27, 1987). The
lawyer attempted to appeal and have the trial judge's opinion vacated. The appellate court
held, however, that all issues were moot after the original parties to the underlying dispute
settled and paid all the sanctions. The court shrugged off the lawyer's concerns on the
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maybe even some prosecutors. 257 Jack Cade would
approve of these laws.
I will address professional ethics in detail on another day, but a
few things might best be said now about lawyers' complicity. We
have already looked at the questions of whether and of when a
lawyer may be charged with having "suborned" perjury within the
meaning of section 1622. Now we will look at the matter of lawyer
complicity under the new "witness tampering" statute, 18 U.S.C.
section 1512.
Let us consider the problem of coaching. American lawyers
ordinarily prepare their witnesses.2 8 Most would consider it
-

theory that they were not "concrete" - they were "speculative." Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift
Parts Mfg. Co., 972 F2d 817 (7th Cir. 1992). If the lawyer had not willingly "settled,"
shouldn't he have been given a chance to obtain appellate review of these accusations of
"possible" violations?
256. See United States v. Kalevas, 622 F Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y 1985). In United States v.
Davila, 698 F2d 715 (5th Cir. 1983), the defendant and two others (one an attorney), were
indicted for conspiracy to suborn perjury. The charges against the defendant were dismissed
after he pled guilty to misprision of a felony. The lawyer and the other alleged conspirators
were later acquitted of conspiracy to suborn perjury. Defendant thought that he might obtain
relief from his conviction on the plea to misprision of a felony, but he was disappointed. The
appellate court let the conviction stand, quoting language from the Supreme Court's opinion
in Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25 (1980), that "while symmetry of results may be
intellectually satisfying, it is not required." Id. at 721. United States v. Ferreyra-Tagle, 942
F2d 794 (9th Cir. 1991) reported on a Peruvian lawyer who pled guilty to section 1512(b)
witness tampering, but no details regarding the crime are provided.
257. Question: If a federal prosecutor threatens to revoke a witness' previously grahted
immunity if the witness testifies for another defendant, causing the witness to evade a
defense subpoena, has the prosecutor violated 18 U.S.C. section 1512? Compare the turn of
events reported by John Cheves, Judge, Prosecutor Erred, U.S. Appeals Court Says
(referring to United States v. Foster, 128 F3d 949 (6th Cir. 1997)), THE LEXINGTON [KY.]
HERALD-LEADER, Nov. 5, 1997, at B1. Compare the conduct in United States v. Hammond, 815
F2d 302 (5th Cir. 1987) (prosecutor imprisoned a defense witness to prevent the witness
from testifying). On October 15, 1995, the Chicago Tribune ran a story by Eric Zorn, a
reporter who has been relentless in his coverage of the alleged "framing" of Rolando Cruz on
charges of kidnapping, rape, and murder. The story was styled Tape Sinks Dupage Cop
Deeper Into the Ooze of Lies, Cm. TRm., Oct 15, 1995, at 1. The tape in question was from a
security camera in a pawn shop. It recorded a 58-minute interview in which a potential
state's witness, who recanted earlier testimony incriminating defendant Cruz, was being fed
misinformation by the officer in order to get him to recant his recantation. Near the end of
the interview, the officer allegedly said that the prosecutor "can play hardball, too" and
"f[***] you, we'll arrest you for perjury." Id. Pretty rough stuff.
258. It is asserted that British, Australian, and Canadian lawyers view American
practices as unethical, if not illegal. See, e.g., Karen L. K Miller, Zip To Nil?: A Comparison
of American and English Lawyer's Standards of Professional Conduct, CA32 ALI-ABA 199
(1995), at 203. It is true that barristers follow the guild rule that prevents them from
interviewing witnesses, except clients and expert witnesses. Id. at 222 (citing CODE OF
CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES,
607.3, Annexe H(6) (1990)). But don't
solicitors interview and prepare witnesses? Furthermore, it has been suggested that the
"gingering" of expert witnesses is not unheard of in both civil and criminal cases. See CAROL
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unprofessional not to go over the expected testimony with a
there are always limits - witness
witness. 259 Within limits
26
preparation is ethical. 0
In a widely cited opinion, the Justices of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina spouted the conventional [American] wisdom, and
then some!
It is not improper for an attorney to prepare his witness for
trial, to explain the applicable law in any given situation and
to go over before trial the attorney's questions and the
witness' answers so that the witness will be ready for his
appearance in court, will be more at ease because he knows
what to expect, and will give his testimony in the most
effective manner that he can.[ 26 1] . . . Nothing improper has
occurred so long as the attorney is preparing the witness to
give the witness' testimony at trial and not the testimony that
JONES, EXPERT WITNESSES (1994). Still, the American attitude is "wide-open" by comparison.
259. Compare United States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288, 1296-97 (l1th Cir. 1988):
[Witness] was an accountant called by [Codefendant A]. [Witness] testified that an
associate had prepared the chart reflecting coin orders and deliveries and that
[Witness] had reviewed the chart, comparing it to the customer files. During the
*government's cross-examination, it became apparent that [Witness] was either lying or
had been extremely slipshod. Defense counsel was informed that [Witness] in fact had
not supervised the chart, in turn the defense lawyers told the court that they were
concerned that the witness was committing perjury. The Court instructed the jury not
to consider [Witness'] testimony against [Codefendant B], and granted [Codefendant C]
a continuance to obtain another accountant. [Codefendant As] motion for a mistrial
was denied. [Codefendant A] now argues that he was entitled to a mistrial because,
through no fault of his own, perjured testimony infiltrated the trial, prejudicing him
and resulting in a miscarriage of justice.. . . This is not a case where the defendant is
ambushed by the government, but instead a case where the defendant ill-advisedly
chose to present evidence which was subject to devastating impeachment. In an
adversary system, absent governmental misconduct affecting the evidence, a defendant
must accept the consequences of the evidence he offers. Had the defense adequately
prepared and examined [Witness] and his proposed testimony, the defense would not
have permitted [Witness] to take the stand and suffer such impeachment
Id.
260. See discussion in RicHARD H. UNDERWOOD AND WILLIAM FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHics
(1988); WniIAM FORTUNE, RIcHARD UNDERWOOD AND EDWARD IMWINKELRIED, MODERN LITIGATION
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HANDBOOK (1996) ("Modern Litigation"); Richard Wydick,
The Ethics Of Witness Coaching, 17 CARDOZO L REv. 1 (1995).
261. See United States v. Poppers, 635 F. Supp. 1034 (N.D. Il. 1986) (it is not
obstruction of justice to coach witness to present story in "best" light, as opposed to
coaching a witness to lie). See also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 6 F3d 336 (5th Cir.
1993) (it is not obstruction of justice or witness tampering to give a witness an affidavit with
statements not previously discussed in it, or to attempt to persuade a witness, in an arms
length interview, even aggressively, that her initial version of a certain fact situation is not
complete or accurate).
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and not

Where do we draw the line between preparation (permissible
coaching) and subornation of perjury? Most of us "know
[subornation] when we see it," even if we cannot come up with a
definitional "litmus test." "There is a fine line between coaching
someone to lie and coaching someone to present a story in the
'best' light." 264 Coaching, "woodshedding," or "horseshedding" of
2
witnesses has been viewed as ethical, while the "gingering" 5 of
witnesses has been condemned. Consider this language from
United States v. Root and Forde:
Appellee Forde has injected a new element in oral argument
not contained in his brief. He urges that an attorney in
counseling his client has latitude in aiding the client in the
.presentation of the client's story at trial time. Quaere: Does
this attorney-client relationship permit the client to relate a
story manufactured by the attorney as Count One of this
26
indictment charges? Answer. No. 6

What follows is hardly a detailed catalogue of tricks used down
at the woodshed. 6 7 From time to time, practitioners have tried to
justify virtually every one of these techniques on the theory that
262. What about the lawyer suggesting a substitution of terms, for example "cut" for
"stab"? The practice of suggesting alternative words and phrases is widespread. See the
interesting case of Haworth v. Wyoming, 840 P2d 912, 914 (1992) (The prosecutor learned
all about "weekend trial preparation sessions" from a deputy sheriff who was working
off-duty for the defense lawyer!).
263. State v. McCormick, 259 S.E.2d 880, 882 (N.C. 1979) (citing ALAN E. MoRRUI, TRIAL
DimpOMcy, Ch. 3, Pt. 8 (1973)). For a helpful bar association ethics opinion, see D.C. Comm.
on Ethics, Op. 79 (1980). See also United States v. Torres, 809 F2d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1987)
(to the effect that defense counsel invited an objection, which was sustained, and a reply
from the prosecutor in closing argument, by persisting in characterizing as "sinister" the
prosecutor's nine-hour session with a witness).
264. United States v. Poppers, 635 F Supp. 1034, 1037 (N.D. IM. 1986) (the latter is not
obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. section 1503).
265. "Gingering" or "gingering-up" is a British term referring to improper rehearsal of a
witness, amounting to spicing up the witness' testimony. See C.P. HARvEy, THE ADVOcATE's
DEVl 65 (1958).
266. 366 F.2d 377, 383 (9th Cir. 1966) (spin-off of the Frank Sinatra, Jr. kidnapping
affair).
267. For the techniques of coaching at depositions, see In re Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 502 F. Supp. 1092, 1096-99 (C.D. Cal. 1980)
(defendant's lawyers attempting to represent lower level employee and former employee
witnesses, and control their testimony); Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (particularly harsh judicial criticism of coaching during depositions, and unusual rules
or guidelines set forth).
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"it's ok as long as the lawyer is trying to get the truth."26s "All I did
was tell the witness to listen to the question, and answer only the
question - don't volunteer anything." For the most part this is
good and ethical advice. But what does the lawyer mean to convey
when he or she says that? What does the witness hear? Such
advice can go "over the line."269
Some techniques are quite crude, and many lawyer coaches are
quite bold. I have seen witnesses carry scripts 270 and cribnotes to
the stand, despite the fact that scripts and cribnotes may be seized
2 1 Most
by the cross-examiner and turned against the witness.
268. See, e.g., James Altman, Witness PreparationConflicts, 22 LMG. 38 (Fall 1995).
This is an excellent article, and Mr. Altman's purpose is to point out the ethical pitfalls. But
as I will argue later, he may be too ready to dismiss criticisms of the standard techniques as
"academic."
269. See Higgins, supra note 250, at 52. Altman, supra note 268, suggests that the
lawyer might have gone over the line in United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1443 (6th Cir.
1986), when she told witnesses how to answer. questions "truthfully," but in a manner that
would divert the examiner's attention away from the contents of a critical and "unfavorable"
conversation. Can a list of instructions to witnesses handed out before depositions (in some
venue such a song sheet is known as a "gouge") go too far? Much ink has been spilled
regarding a document styled "points to make in an affidavit," which is now floating around in
the latest Washington, D.C. sex scandal. The "talking points" were reprinted in The
Washington Post on February 10, 1998 at A8. See also Michael Isikoff, Diary of a Scandal,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 21, 1998; Michael Isikoff and Evan Thomas, Clinton and the Intern,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2, 1998, at 31, 37; What Crimes Might Have Been Committed [in the
'Lewinsky affair']? ORLANDO [FL] SENTINEL, Jan. 26, 1998, at A10.
Sometimes it's hard to say whether any line has been crossed, even if something smells.
For an interesting set of instructions, see Accidental Exposure, a piece published in Harper's
Magazine, Jan. 1998, at 20-24, which sets forth the verbatim text of Baron & Budd's
Preparationfor Your Deposition. (Baron & Budd is a prominent Dallas, Tex. law firm
specializing in class action tort suits.). See also Special Report: Tinal Conduct - Ethics of
Witness Preparation48 ABAIBNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUcT (FEB. 18, 1998). I like
the line (a variation on the theme of "don't volunteer") that tells witnesses that "[a]t the
deposition, it might help to pretend that you are a 'prisoner of war' in an enemy camp where
you must give only your 'name, rank, and serial number.'" Id. One assumes that there is
nothing wrong with this instruction in the abstract.
270. In his book, Modern Legal Ethics, Professor Charles Wolfram cites a case from
1880 in which a lawyer was disciplined for "writing out the answers" for a witness: In re
Eldridge, 82 N.Y. 1961 (1880). CHaRLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs 647 n.96 (1986).
271. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 612. Unfortunately, not everybody "gets it." In my first or
second year of practice with a firm, I faced an opposing witness in a tiny municipal court.
During my opponent's direct examination, I kept objecting that the witness was reading a
narrative that he (or someone) had prepared beforehand. He actually had the whole thing
written out. The witness became so frustrated that he threw the script at me. I thought I was
doing a great job, but the judge's puzzled looks turned to anger. He thought I was "being
mean."

Unfortunately, the confused call the shots at all levels, and not just in the Municipal Court
of Franklin County, Ohio. Who can forget the great moments in trial advocacy in the
fran-Contra hearings? Professor John Appelgate of the University of Cincinnati was watching
too, but unlike me, he had the presence of mind to write some of it down. Here the
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witnesses leave their scripts at home. They will not need them if
they have been sufficiently "prepped."
Some lawyers get their clients and friendly witnesses to change
their stories during rehearsal by wincing and throwing up their
hands when a witness mentions a "bad fact." Some lawyers go so
far as to say things like - "If you say that you'll lose . . . its all
over. . . that's the ball game."272 Some will say that such things do
not happen, or that they occur only in the imaginings of
lawyer-hating academics. But they do happen.
Almost as crude a technique is "group preparation," in which
witnesses are prepared together, and coached to give "consistent"
testimony. This used to be the sort of thing that one would expect
only from law enforcement officers. 273 Now lawyers on both sides
of the "v." are using the technique in civil as well as criminal
cases. 274 Again, this sort of preparation can result in a waiver of
privilege and work product, 275 but only if the lawyer "gets caught."
Perhaps, not quite so bad is the so-called "hub-and-spoke"
method, in which group consistency is assured by separate
interviews with members of the group, in which each is made
aware of the testimony of others. 276 Another variation of the same
theme is the way that a witness can be shown the error of their
questions are
from Lt. Col.
North:
Liman:
North:

Sullivan:
Liman:

Sullivan:

coming from Mr. Liman, counsel for the Committee, the answers are coming
Oliver North, and the objections are coming from Mr. Sullivan, counsel for
[Y]ou are looking at a book there. What is the book, sir?
The book is made up of notes that I have made in trying to prepare with
counsel for this hearing.
(objecting) Don't tell him what it includes.
Well, I think that if a witness is looking at something that I, as counsel, am
entitled to see what he is refreshing his recollection with.

I think you are wrong. That is a product of lawyers working with clients.
...That is none of your business....
Liman did not argue waiver of work product or privilege (euphemisms for attorney-client
privilege and work-product), and there was no one to rule on such fine points. Liman simply
dropped the matter! See John Applegate, Witness Preparation,68 TExI L REV. 277 (1989).
272. Compare Joseph Piorkowski, Professional Conduct and the Preparation of
Witnesses for Tha: Defining the Acceptable Limitation of 'Coaching', 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETlucs
389, 398 (1987).
273. See Ex Parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
274. See Applegate, supra note 271, at 14-15, 37-38 (alluding to United States v. Ebens,
800 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir. 1986)).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 289 n.55 (alluding to United States v. Townsley, 843 F2d 1070 (8th Cir.
1988)).
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ways by placing their observations in "context" - "Well, that's not
how your boss remembers it!"27 7 Coercive, isn't it? On the other
hand, is it wrong to compare the witness' recollection with other
evidence if it will help him remember? This can be done at trial, at
least up to a point. The witness' certainty could be tested by asking
the witness if he or she "is aware of the boss' testimony," and so
on. On the other hand, this cross-examination would be done in
open court, and the court and the opponent could see if it were
misleading and coercive. Again, arguments can be made both ways
about the legitimacy of the technique. 278 It depends on the
circumstances, and on the lawyer's intent, doesn't it?
Some argue that even the old-fashioned "lecture" is perfectly
respectable if the lawyer means well. Most readers know that the
"lecture" is the technique that was used by Jimmy Stewart (usually
playing the epitome of the straight-shooter) to help his client come
up with a "temporary insanity" defense in the movie, Anatomy of a
27 9 Before the defendant committed himself to a story, he
Murder.
was told about the defenses that might be available if only there
were facts to support them. The defendant was not stupid, and
more or less tried the defenses on for size.
Are any of these techniques "witness tampering" under the new
criminal statute? Remember that a violation of 18 U.S.C. section
1512(b)(1) can be based on the lawyer's "misleading conduct"
toward the witness, with "intent to influence" the witness'
testimony in an official proceeding. That's all there is to a prima
facie case. 28° It is an affirmative defense, that the defendant's
277. Piorkowsld, supra note 272, at 399.
278. See Altman, supra note 268, at 40.
279. The 1959 movie was based on a 1958 play of the same name written by Michigan
Supreme Court Justice, John D. Voelker, and published under the pseudonym, "Robert
Traver." John D. Voelker Dead at 87; Author of "Anatomy of a Murder", N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
1991, at B9. Voelker based his novel on his experiences as a defense counsel in the early
1950's. Id.
280. In Kiner v. Indiana, 643 N.E.2d 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), defense counsel falsely
suggested to an eyewitness on the stand that an old photo was a photo of the defendant.
When the witness bit and testified that she could have picked out the man in the photo as
the defendant, counsel triumphantly announced that it was not a photo of the defendant. The
court was not amused, and rebuked counsel for a violation of Rule of Prof'l Conduct
3.3(a)(1). Could a prosecutor in federal court charge the defense counsel with "witness
tampering" by engaging in "misleading conduct"? Presumably, counsel would try to argue
that he did it to get to the truth - that the witness couldn't actually identify the defendant.
But the charge or threat of a charge might be successful in intimidating counsel. In any
event, lawyers exhibit a dangerously cavalier attitude when it comes to section 1512. See,
e.g., Michael Iskoff and Evan Thomas, Clinton and the Intern, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2, 1998, at 31,
40: "Speaking not for attribution ... several white-collar crime lawyers suggested that
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lawyer must establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that his
or her conduct "consisted solely of lawful conduct and that [the
lawyer's] sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the
28
other person to testify truthfully." '
Lawyer John Wesley Hall, Jr. provides "witness tampering"
scenarios that might be encountered by a criminal defense lawyer.
Your client says "Witness B is going to say such-and-such
about me. [1] I'm going to talk to him and get him to not be
so positive against me. He knows the truth." [2] Worse, your
client says "I'm going to show him why he needs to change his
story." [3] Or worse, your client says "I'm going to pay him to
shut up." [4] Even worse, your client says "I'm going to kick
28 2
his *** [and show him who's boss]."
Hall claims that a California lawyer was indicted under section
1512 "for telling witnesses . . . that they did not have to talk to
government officers without consulting a lawyer."283 This seems
pretty far out; but then again, indictments are pretty much had (by
Jordan may have coached Lewinsky in a way that subtly got the message across without
exposing anyone to obstruction-of-justice charges. When preparing witnesses, a clever lawyer
can ask questions that produce answers the lawyer wants to hear - without ever suggesting
that the witness lie." Id.
281. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(d). This exercise in burden shifting has been ruled constitutional!
See, e.g., United States v. Clemens, 658 F. Supp. 1116 (E.D. Pa. 1987); United States v.
Davenport, 622 F Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y 1985). It has been suggested that this part of the
statute was put in to head off "the possibility of a judge, prosecutor, or presiding officer
violating the statute by threatening a witness with a perjury prosecution for false testimony."
Judah Best and Virginia White-Mahaffey, An Analysis of the Victim and Witness Protection
Act of 1982, 134 PLI/CRit 89. Of course, such warnings can go overboard and result in the
reversal of a conviction if the defendant is deprived of the benefit of the witness' testimony.
See Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972); United States v. Risken, 788 F2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1986).
In terms of excuses, the following thought should be considered: "[Tihe payment of a sum
of money to a witness to 'tell the truth' is as clearly subversive of the proper administration
of justice as to pay him to testify to what is not true." In Re Robinson, 136 N.Y.S. 548, 556
(N.Y. App. Div. 1912).
282. Hall, supra note 250, at 332-33. Lawyers in civil cases are also subject to
allegations of misconduct. For an interesting case in point, see Red Ball Interior Demolition
Corp. and John Palmadessa v. Daniel Palmadessa, 908 F. Supp. 1226 (1995). In this classic
case of closely-held corporation "squeeze out," involving brother against brother, allegations
were made that plaintiff's counsel should be disqualified for making allegedly improper
payments to a lay witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 201(d) (1994), and for allegedly
misleading or threatening statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1512(b). The judge
denied the motion to disqualify. On the issue of payments to witnesses, see ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof'l Resp., Formal Op. 96-402 (1996) (Propriety of Payments to Occurrence
Witnesses).
283. Hall, supra note 250, at 334.
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the prosecutor) for the asking.2s 4

In my own home state of Kentucky, a lawyer was recently
suspended from practice following his conviction under section
1512(b)(1) for attempting to persuade another person not to testify
in official proceedings. 285 The lawyer also got a fifty-seven month
prison sentence!m
By expressing less than unalloyed enthusiasm for these new
federal criminal laws, I do not want to leave the reader with the
impression that subornation does not take place or that lawyers are
harshly or unfairly treated when they "get caught." On the contrary,
if the Whee/er 287 case is any indication, nothing could be further
from the truth. My point is simply that section 1512 may sweep too
broadly and invite abuse by the prosecution and law enforcement.
The bad cases may end up going unpunished or going lightly
punished while draconian measures are reserved for the trivial or
even the innocent. Of course, some would say, "That's the Law."
While 18 U.S.C. section 1512 (the new federal witness tampering
statute) applies only to federal proceedings, 288 state laws have also
widened the net. For example, Kentucky law now punishes some
"unsworn falsifications" (lies) intended to mislead any public
servant in the performance of his or her duty. The Kentucky
statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. section 523.100, only relates to certain written
statements, false records or forged instruments, or false samples,
specimens, maps, boundary marks, or the like, however. 289 The
284. It is probably worth noting that a variety of allegations of misconduct of counsel
may be advanced post conviction. The United States Supreme Court did lawyers a great
disservice when it decided to cut off arguments in direct appeals through the application of
"waiver and by-pass" rules, only to entertain substantially similar arguments in habeas corpus
under the rubric of "ineffective assistance of counsel." Nowadays, the dissatisfied client
(inmate) will almost certainly attack his former defense lawyer with a variety of creative (if
not contrived) claims, all with the encouragement of a taxpayer-supported cadre of public
advocates. The latest weapon is the claim that counsel was suspected of subornation, and
that counsel therefore was "chilled" - prevented from furnishing sufficiently zealous
advocacy - by threats from the prosecutor or the trial judge. "What fresh hell is this?" One
may well ask. Compare Johnston v. Love, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21426 (E.D. Pa., Oct. 18,
1995) (convicted murderer unsuccessfully raised claims that he should get a new trial
because a witness suggested that defense counsel was accused of subornation by a witness,
that the judge gave dirty looks to counsel, and that counsel was intimidated, failed to testify
to rebut the witness' testimony, etc..
).
285. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Zeman, 828 S.W.2d 609 (Ky. 1992).
286. See Zeman v. United States, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29444 (6th Cir., Nov. 7, 1996).
287. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
288. See McKinney v. Illinois, 720 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Park South Assoc. v.
Fischbein, 626 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
289. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 523.100 (Banks-Baldwin 1994 & 1997 Cum. Supp.).
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statute is not as sweeping as 18 U.S.C. section 1001, which is
discussed infra. Ky. Rev. Stat. section 523.110 makes it an offense
to give a "peace officer" a false name or address with intent to
mislead the officer as to one's identity.29° However, the offender
must first be warned that giving a false name or address is a
criminal offense. It can be seen that in at least some states,
legislators are not so enthusiastic about "widening the net" (lest
they be caught up in it?). On the other hand, Kentucky is typical, to
the extent that it has enacted a number of laws punishing acts
amounting to "interference with judicial administration" - such as
witness tampering through bribery, harassment, intimidation, or
retaliation, or tampering with physical evidence and the like. 291 But
nothing so sweeping as 18 U.S.C. section 1512 has been proposed.
FALSE STATEMENTS

292

And the Lord said unto Cain, Where is Abel thy brother?
And he said, I know not: Am I my brother's keeper?

Genesis 3:11-12a

The text of 18 U.S.C. section 1001 makes no mention of whether
the oath is necessary. The statute punishes conduct that takes
place outside adjudicative proceedings. Many find this statute
worrying. Many would be surprised to learn that lying to a
government agent is a major federal crime, in and of itself. Not
only does the law seem to deny human nature; there is something
alien about it. Some might think that this is the sort of thing one
ordinarily associates with totalitarian societies. 294 Adnittedly, lies
not under oath can amount to actionable and criminal fraud
(already proscribed by other laws), and can result in damage due
to misdirection. But the possibilities for entrapment, harassment,
and other abuses are legion. If you can't make your case, if you
290. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 523.110 (Banks-Baldwin 1994 & 1997 Cum. Supp.).
291. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 514.010-524.120 (Banks-Baldwin 1994 & 1997 Cum.
Supp.).
292. For a recent survey of 18 U.S.C. section 1001, see Jennifer Bier & David Hibey,
False Statements, 34 Am.CRiM. L REV. 567 (1997).

293. The first shot at an "exculpatory No" defense?
294. Compare JOSEPH COTCHETr AND STEPHEN Pizzo, THE ETics GAP 92 (1991) (quoting
(disapprovingly?) Professor (and defense lawyer) Michael igar as saying of one prosecution
that it goes to show that citizens "should not talk to their government."). This is not a
healthy state of affairs.

1998

Perjury!

can't get your target for any apparent substantive offense at all,
take a stab at it anyway, get them to lie, and then, get them for the
lie. What you started out accusing them of need never be proved.
In a sense, the statute was born of war - war inevitably
expands the power of the state.A95 An ancestor of section 1001
appeared during the Civil War as a measure to curb frauds
perpetrated by' military personnel. Congress tinkered with
(broadened) this section from time to time. 29 6 In 1996, however, 18
U.S.C. section 1001 was revamped by Congress, as a direct result of
297
the Supreme Court's decision in Hubbard v. United States.
In prosecutions under section 1001, the defense of "literal truth"
295. BRUCE PORTER, WAR AND THE RISE OF THE STATE: THE MILITARY FOUNDATIONS OF
MODERN POLITICS (1994).
296. For a history of the pre-1996 statute, see United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 508
(1955). Bramblett's holding that section 1001 applied to false statements made to all three
branches of government was overturned by Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995).
See also Neslund, supra note 18, at 10-47.
Congress was so disturbed by Hubbard that within days of the decision, Rep. Bill Martini
(R-N.J.) introduced HR3166 to amend section 1001 to make it applicable to all three
branches of the federal government, not merely the executive branch (as the statute had
been interpreted by the Hubbard Court). A similar resolution was introduced in the Senate
(S1734). Both resolutions passed their respective houses unanimously and emerged from the
House-Senate Conference Committee under the title, "The False Statements Accountability
Act of 1996." See 142 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S11605-08 for statements made by various
Senators in support of the act. At the same time, Congress also amended 18 U.S.C. sections
1515 and 6005, and 28 U.S.C. section 1365. Interestingly, until Hubbard, Congress ignored the
gap in section 1001, although several decisions by the D.C. Circuit explicitly interpreted 1001
as only applicable to the executive branch. Notable among these decisions was United States
v. Rostenkowski, 59 F3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1995). See also United States v. Brooks, 945 F Supp.
830 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (false statement in submission to Copyright Office does not violate 18
U.S.C. section 1001 - false statement not a crime if made before 1996 because this was not
an "administrative matter" and Copyright Office is not a "department or agency" of the
executive branch).
Hubbard was superseded by the 1996 change in section 1001, however, as recognized in
United States v. Oakar, 111 E3d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Congresswoman Oakar was convicted
by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of providing false financial
disclosure statements to the House Ethics Committee investigating a $50,000 overdraft of her
account at the infamous House Bank (among other charges). The court found that 18 U.S.C.
section 1001 was inapplicable to Oakar because the false statements were made in May 1992,
but noted that the False Statements Accountability Act of 1996 amended the statute,
"expand[ing] its reach to the judicial and legislative branches." Oakar, 111 F.3d at 158 n.1.
297. See supra note 234 for the complete text of 18 U.S.C. section 1001 (1996). The
1996 version deletes the vague and problematic, "any department or agency of the United
States" (construed by the Hubbard Court as applying only to the executive branch) and
substitutes "the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United
States." The new subsection (b) provides that section 1001(a) is inapplicable to judicial
proceedings. The new subsection (c) covers matters within the jurisdiction of the legislative
branch, specifically applying section 1001(a) to administrative matters of the Congress and
House and Senate hearings and investigations.
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is available,28 as is a related defense that the defendant reasonably
2
believed the statement to mean something that was not false. 9
Furthermore, until the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Brogan v. United States, ° the sweep of section 1001 had been
limited by two very important lines of authority. The first was the
now discredited exception for the "exculpatory No." Under this
doctrine, a simple denial of culpability in response to an
30 1
investigatory question could not form the basis for a prosecution.
This judicial doctrine, at least, took some account of human nature
and human frailty. But even in the heyday of the "exculpatory No,"
there was disagreement as to the applicability of the statute when
the alleged offender had gone further and said something more
affirmative to mislead the investigating agent.3 ° The second
limitation was derived from the language of the statute itself. That
is, the statute applied to "matters within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States." 3°3 According to the
United States Supreme Court decision in Hubbard v. United
States,30 1 a federal court was neither a "department" nor an
"agency." Prior to Hubbard, many lower courts had already reached
a similar result by relying on a judge-made "judicial function
exception." According to this doctrine, false statements made to a
court while the court is performing its adjudicative function were
not covered by section 1001.305 For example, the Sixth Circuit took.
298. See Neslund, supra note 18, at 10-44 (citing United States v. Adler, 62 F2d 1287
(8th Cir. 1980)).
299. See Neslund, supra note 18, at 10-43-44, collecting the cases; Bier & Hibley, supra
note 292, at 582.
300. Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998).
301. For discussions of the "exculpatory No" defense, see Sandra Turner, Note: Would I
Lie To You? The Sixth Circuit Joins the 'Exculpatory No' Controversy in United States v.
Steele, 81 Ky. LJ. 213 (1992-93); Timothy Nicholson, Note, Just Say 'No'. An Analysis of the
"ExculpatoryNo" Doctrine,39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L 225 (1991); Giles Borch, Note,
False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the Exculpatory No, 57 U. CHi L REV.
1273 (1990).
302. See United States v. Rogers, 466 U.S. 475 (1984).
303. The statute does not apply to false statements made to a state agency if the
federal government is not sufficiently involved in the particular state program. See United
States v. Holmes, 111 F3d 463 (6th Cr. 1997).
304. 514 U.S. 695 (1995).
305. See, e.g., United States v. Masterpol, 940 E2d 760 (2d Cir. 1991) (After his
conviction the defendant got two witnesses to write letters for him falsely recanting their
trial testimony, and then had his lawyer offer one of the letters to the sentencing judge in
the hope of influencing the sentence. He was then indicted and convicted for violating
section 1001, but the Second Circuit reversed. Sentencing is an adjudicative function, so
section 1001 did not apply at the time the statement was made.). The 1996 amendments still
exempt statements made during adjudicative proceedings. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
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the position that section 1001 did not apply to the introduction of
false documents into evidence in a criminal case, because a
contrary ruling might "undermine" the perjury statute, which was
then limited by the "two-witness rule." 306 There is something ironic
in the fact that the case that first suggested a judicial function
exception expressed concern that section 1001 might otherwise be
interpreted so broadly as to criminalize conduct that "falls well
within the boundary of responsible advocacy!"3 7 The opinion in
Morgan v. United States" upheld the conviction of a lawyer
impersonator" under section 1001 for concealing his true name,
identity, and nonadmission to the bar, but did so on the basis that
his lie was made to the court in a "housekeeping" or
"administrative" context. The court opined:
We are certain that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court
intended the statute to include traditional trial tactics within
the statutory terms "conceals or covers up." . . . Does a
defendant 'cover up . . . a material fact' when he pleads not
guilty? Does an attorney 'cover up' when he moves to exclude
hearsay testimony he knows to be true, or when he makes a
summation on behalf of a client he knows to be guilty?310
Fortunately, we need not answer these nagging questions - for
the time being - because the Supreme Court told us in Hubbard
that the text of the statute makes the recognition of a "judicial
function exception" quite unnecessary. In May 1996, a freshman
congressman and former federal prosecutor introduced a bill to
"overturn" Hubbard and make 18 U.S.C. section 1001 directly
applicable to false statements made in court. 31' This provision did
306. United States v. Erhardt, 381 F2d 173, 175 (1967). A stronger argument might be
that the application of section 1001 to in-court statements might undermine the
Congressional policy favoring "absolution [of] perjurers who retract under prescribed
conditions to secure truth through correction of previously false testimony." George Aycock
III, Note, Nothing but the Truth: A Solution to the Current Inadequacies of the Federal
Perjury Statutes, 28 VAL L REv. 247, 279 (1993) (arguing against section 1621 prosecutions
that could not be brought under section 1623 because of timely retraction).
307. Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 709. Compare such of the Model Rules of Prof l Conduct as
Rule 3.3(a)(1) & (4), 3.4(b) & (e), and 4.1.
308. 309 F2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert denied, 373 U.S. 917 (1963). Does Morgan
survive Hubbard?
309. You would think we already have enough members of the bar impersonating
lawyers.
310. Morgan, 309 F2d at 237.
311. Harvey Berkman, Bill to Ensnare 'Liars' May Widen Criminal Net: Critics Fear
Lawyers Could Be Charged for Trial Tactics, NAT'L L.J., July 10, 1995, at A9. These fears
proved groundless. See infra note 312 and accompanying text..
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not survive in the final form of the bill passed by Congress and
signed by the President, however, to the vast relief of trial counsel
312
everywhere.
The "False Statements Accountability Act of 1996" could prove
useful in other contexts to curb abuses that are beyond the reach
of the perjury statutes. For example, scientific misconduct and
fraud could be prosecuted under section 1001 as well as under
section 287 (the "false claims" statute). 313 Scientific fraud and
314
phony expert testimony have seldom been prosecuted as perjury.
DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE AND OTHER FORENSIC MISCHIEF

So if all do their duty they need not fear harm.
William Blake, The Chimney Sweeper (1794)315

The law-trained reader will almost certainly recall reading the
case of Armory v. Delamiie,3 6 in which a poor chimney sweep
took a ring that he had found to a jeweler, only to have the
jeweler's lackey3 17 pry the jewel from its setting and return only the
setting. "What stone was that?" "Go away boy!" The chimney sweep
was not amused - nor was he afraid! He went out and hired a
mouthpiece! The case is usually assigned in the first year Property
312. See U.S.C. § 1001(b). This section specifically excludes "parties to a judicial
proceeding, or that party's counsel, for statements, representations, writings, or documents
submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding." Id.
313. See C. Beth Sise, Comment, Scientific Misconduct in Academia: A Survey and
Analysis of Applicable Law, 28 SAN DIEGO L REv. 401 (1991). See also Patricia Woolf,
Deception in Scientific Research, 29 Ju armSCS J. 67 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1986). This
statute provides:
Section 287. False, Fictitious, or Fraudulent Claims
Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval
service of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any claim upon
or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such
claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not more than five
years and shall be subject to a fine in the amount provided in this title.
Id.

314. For a discussion of the scientist, the expert witness, and perjury, see Underwood,
"X-Spurt" Witnesses, supra note 85; Paul Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in
Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories,4 VA_ J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 439
(1997).
315. WniuAM BL.AKE, SONGS OF INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE (The Folio Society, London,
1992 ed.)
316. 1 Strange 505 (KB. 1722).
317. Delamarie was a famous goldsmith of the time.

1998

Perjury!

789

Law course. Few recognize that the case is one of the earliest
Anglo-American cases dealing with the subject of spoliation - the
deliberate destruction of evidence, and the evidentiary inference
that may be drawn therefrom. 18 They probably do remember (I
hope!) that the chimney sweep won the case.
The "bigger net" we have been talking about is now available to
sweep up spoliators and persons who intimidate witnesses or
procure their nonavailability, including attorneys who are not
careful. Indeed, attorneys are particularly vulnerable to charges by
opponents in civil cases, judges, and prosecutors in criminal cases
- charges that are sometimes well-grounded3 1 9 and sometimes not
3 20
so well grounded.
318. I refer the reader to that most excellent work by my favorite authors. See WnLAM
FoRruNE, RICHARD UNDERWOOD, AND EDWARD IMWINKELEIED, MODERN LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBmY HANDBOOK 235-38 (1996).

319. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 FR.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y 1997).
Compare United States v. Conneaut Indus., Inc., 852 E Supp. 116 (D. R.I. 1994) (corporate
destruction of evidence and section 1512); United States v. Davenport, 622 F Supp. 1523
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (criminal defense attorney charged with subornation of perjury, intimidation
of witnesses, engaging in misleading conduct to cause grand jury witnesses to evade
subpoenas, etc.).
320. Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., Inc., 972 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1992)
(unpublished disposition) 1987 WL 19150 (N.D. ll., Oct. 27, 1987)) (trial judge sanctioned
lawyer for supposedly participating in some kind of witness tampering and fabrication of
evidence; appellate court applied mootness doctrine to deny the lawyer the opportunity for
review of the trial judge's accusations). The reader may recall that the "Menendez Brother's"
defense attorney, Leslie Abramson, was accused of improperly inducing a defense
psychiatrist to delete material from his notes before the notes were turned over to the
prosecution. It apparently is not uncommon for lawyers working with experts to make
"suggestions" along these lines (whether proper or improper). See Underwood, "X-Spurt"
Witnesses, supra note 85, at 391-403 (discussing prosecutors' misconduct in dealing with
experts); CAROL JONEs, EXPERT WrrNEssm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) (discussing the
relationship between lawyers and experts in Britain). The Los Angeles District Attorney
ultimately decided not to pursue any charges against Abramson. See Abramson Off the Hook,
ATLANTA CONSTITuTION, Oct. 12, 1997, at 23A. But early on, she was put in the position of

invoking the Fifth under questioning from the court, and suffered a number of assaults in the
press. See, e.g., Abramson, CrrY NEWS Svc. OF LA., Apr. 25, 1996; Menendez Expert Regrets
Changing Notes at Insistence of Attorney, THE TESTIFYING EXPERT, Vol. 4, No. 5 (May 1996);
Lawyer Defends Herself Against Accusations, TELEGRAPH HERALD [DUBUQUE, IA], Apr. 22,
1996, at A9; Facing the Court of Public Opinion, L.A. TnMES, Apr. 19, 1996, at BI; Judge Won't
Remove Menendez Attorney, COMMERCIAL APPEAL [MEMPHM, TENN.], APR 10, 1996, AT 8A, Judge
Keeps Abramson as Menendez's Lawyer.
LA Tmnss, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al; Peter Jennings,
ABC World News Tonight, Apr. 9, 1996.
In her book, The Defense Is Ready: Life in the Trenches of Criminal Law (1977), Ms.
Abramson dismissed the episode as a discovery dispute. Before the first trial, the expert had
been instructed to edit out some materials that had already been disallowed by the court and
make some clarifications - innocent changes to consist of "the obvious crossing out and
adding that anyone reading them [could] see." The expert apparently misunderstood and
rewrote the entire pages "and even removed things [Ms. Abramson] had not discussed with
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In my experience, lawyers are generally unaware of the fact that
the new witness tampering statute, 18 U.S.C. section 1512,
3 21
criminalizes a wide variety of coercive and non-coercive acts
intended to cause or induce a person to withhold testimony,
records, documents, or other objects from an official proceeding;
or cause or induce any person to alter, destroy, mutilate, or
conceal any objects with intent to impair its integrity or availability
or; cause or induce any person to evade process to appear or
produce evidence in an official proceeding to absent themselves
3 22
from an official proceeding to which they have been summoned.
him." Id. at 275. According to Ms. Abramson, by the time of the "flap," the prosecutor had
both the edited and unedited versions; no harm intended; and in any event, no harm, no foul.
I gather that Ms. Abramson is no longer under fire. The lesson I draw from this is that it is
dangerous out there. And to quote Mr. Thomas Gray, even the most distinguished advocate
should remember that "a Fav'rite has no friend(s)" - not in the press, anyway.
321. Consider the following ploy, described by Carberry, supra note 199, at 295 (citing
KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1985)):
[I]t is a common defense tactic [in white collar criminal cases] to coach a witness
indirectly into obstruction of the investigation through destruction or non-production
of subpoenaed documents. This is accomplished by telling the client specifically what
the government is seeking and what is necessary for the government to discover to
make its case. The client is then instructed to return to his company and gather the
necessary documents responsive to the subpoena. The attorneys Mann interviewed
admitted that many relevant documents are not produced because a 'smart' client will
not give them to his attorney after such legal instructions.
Id. at 246-47.
Of course, some clients do not need a lawyer's instructions. Compare Jim Fitzgerald, Probe
Finds Documents Withheld in Texaco Case, BUFFAO NEWS, July-15, 1997, at 3A (Executives
stashed documents in a file neatly labeled, "Documents Withheld from Legal," not out of fear
that a lawsuit would be lost, but because of hostility and distrust towards lawyers and the
legal process!); Allanna Sullivan, Texaco's Race-Bias Probe Finds 3 Executives Withheld
Evidence, WALL ST. J., July 15, 1997, at B12.
One also supposes that some clients will not hesitate to blame their lawyers, whether their
lawyers were complicit or not. In an unbelievable turn of events, two former high-level
Texaco officials were acquitted of obstruction of justice charges. See United States v.
Lundwall, 66 USLW 1629 (S.D.N.Y., Apr. 1, 1998) (holding that U.S.C. section 1503 obstruction
of justice statute can be used to prosecute individuals who conceal or destroy documents to
impede discovery in civil cases). The full text of Lundwall can be found at http://Aw.bna.com/
#0421. Observers speculated that the jurors were persuaded by the argument that the
defendants had not been "given (by Texaco's in-house lawyers?) the legal help they needed
to understand what was expected of them" (emphasis added). It seems incredible that
in-house attorneys should be blamed by the jury for not "educating" corporate executives on
such fundamentals. Quid jurores non faciunt? (What a jury won't do?) See HERALD-LEADER
[LExiNGTON, KY.], May 13, 1998, at Cl, C6; Stanley Arkin, Business Crimes, N.YL.J., Apr. 9,
1998, at 3 (discussing the criminal implications of peijury in civil cases). As Artemis Quibble
once observed, "[N]o fact is too patent to be denied." THE ADVENTURES OF ARTEMIS QUIBBLE 83
(1925).
322. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A)-(D). That almost covers the waterfront. But see United
States v. Masterpol, 940 F2d 760 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that with the 1988 amendments to
section 1512, Congress clearly intended to move witness tampering from the reach of section
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Furthermore, the new statute answers the pundits' question about
whether a latter-day President Nixon could "destroy the tapes."
Whatever one's view of the answer under old section 1503, the
answer under section 1512 is that "an official proceeding need not
be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense; and
the testimony, or the record, document, or other object need not
be admissible in evidence or free from a claim of privilege."3 23
JUST DESSERTS? -

SENTENCING UNDER THE GUIDELINES

Devot6es of Doonesbury will remember a younger "B.D." (the
guy who wears a football helmet at all times) sitting in front of the
TV watching a "cops and robbers" show, and enjoying the
announcement of the criminal's sentence at the end - "Here's the
part I like. JUST DESSERTS!"
B.D. would love the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("U.S.S.G."), and would particularly enjoy the story of lawyer
Stanford I. Atkin, whose case is a digression, but only a slight
digression. Atkin was a proponent of a depressingly common scam.
He would take large sums of money from a client, supposedly for
the purpose of bribing the client's trial judge. He would not, in fact,
bribe the judge. In this sort of case, if the outcome is favorable, the
1503; and that there may be a hole in the legislative scheme that allows some kind of
"nonmisleading, nonthreatening, nonintimidating attempt to have a person give false
information" to slip through the net).
It is important to note here that the holding in Lundwall (see supra note 321 - section
1503 applies to civil (as well as criminal) obstruction of justice) directly contradicts the new
survey in White Collar Crime, 35 AM. CRm. L REV. 989, 998, 1008-09 (1998) (suggesting that
neither section 1503 nor section 1512 applies to civil cases). Despite the fact that these
statutes are contained in Title 18, both statutes are clearly applicable to civil cases. See
Stephen Gillers, The Perjury Loophole, N.Y. Tims, Feb. 18, 1998 (citing United States v.
McAfee, 8 F3d 1010 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Donathan, 65 F3d 537 (6th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 1040 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1109 (1995)).
"We categorically reject any suggestion, implicit or otherwise, that perjury is somehow less
serious when made in a civil proceeding. Perjury, regardless of the setting, is a serious
offense that results in incalculable harm to the functioning and integrity of the legal system
as well as to private individuals." Id. (citing United States v. Holland, 22 F3d 1040, 1047
(11th Cir. 1994). Congress agrees - the definition of "official proceedings" under sections
1503 and 1512 does not explicitly distinguish between civil and criminal cases, and thus,
seems to include any judicial proceeding. To explain the fact that perjury in civil
proceedings is rarely prosecuted, Paul Robinson, a law professor at Northwestern, surmised,
"It's not that U.S. attorneys don't think lying in civil cases is a crime. But proving such
charges is usually so difficult that prosecutors don't take the time to try [because of their
heavy caseloadsl." Kate Shatzkin, Perjury Is a Crime Seldom Prosecuted; Legal Experts
Differ on How to Treat Clinton, BALT. SuN, Jan 27, 1998, at 4A.
323. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(e)(1) & (2). For a case involving an attorney, see United States
v. Davenport, 622 F Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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client is presumably satisfied, and none the wiser. If the outcome is
unfavorable, what's the client to do? Demand his money back?
Well, sometimes things take an odd turn, and the client actually
lodges a complaint in return for a deal. One of Atkin's convicted
clients escaped from prison, was recaptured, and turned on Atkin.
Atkin was convicted of obstruction of justice and money
laundering. He vas actually acquitted of a charge of witness
tampering in violation of section 1512, and that is why discussion
of his case may appear to involve a bit of a digression. But the
case is relevant, because his sentence was enhanced under U.S.S.G.
section 3B1.3, which provides for enhancement "if the defendant
. . . used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated
the commission or concealment of the offense." 324 Although Atkin
never did bribe the judge (the judge was unaware of the scam and
did nothing wrong), the evidence showed that the client had
selected Atkin because he was a "friend" of the judge and because
he was a lawyer. Atkin also made an unsuccessful, but cryptic, pass
at soliciting the judge's aid for his client in the course of a
conversation in the judge's chambers, and had the client make the
"bribe" payable to the lawyer's trust account. The visit to chambers
in the role of attorney, and use of the trust account, involved
special lawyer status or skills (skills?) and may also have precluded
suspicion or further inquiry. The Sixth Circuit affirmed
enhancement of the sentence under section 3B1.3!325 Lawyers
beware of yet another "most biting law!"
When a defendant is convicted of perjury, the sentence may be
enhanced on a variety of grounds. For example, the judge may
conclude that the perjury "resulted in substantial interference with
326 or tended to conceal evidence. 327
the administration of justice"
But that is not all there is to enhancement.
Prior to the adoption of the U.S.S.G., federal judges were also
allowed to consider, in sentencing a defendant, conduct of the
defendant for which he or she was not convicted. For example, in
3 28 the Supreme Court held that a
United States v. Grayson,
sentencing judge could weight the defendant's uncharged perjury
when sentencing that defendant for escape from prison. The Court
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 (1996).
United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213 (6th Cir. 1997).
U.S.S.G. § 2J1.3(b)(2) (1996).
U.S.S.G. § 2II.3(c)(1) (1996). I am using as my reference MARCIA SBEIN, SENTENCING
DEFENSE MANUAL- ADVOCACY, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (1997).
328. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
324.
325.
326.
327.
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stated that its ruling was based in part on the relevance of the
uncharged conduct on the issue of defendant's prospects for
rehabilitation; and in part on the practical inability of appellate
review to prevent the use of "firsthand observations of perjury!"
These views were restated in the 1993 case of Dunnigan v. United
States,3 9 in which the Court stated that sentence enhancement
under the Guidelines based on uncharged perjury is "more than a
mere [and presumably impermissible] surrogate for a perjury
prosecution . . . [furthering] . . . legitimate sentencing goals
relating to the principal crime."30
Still, there may be some limits. In United States v. Sassanelli,31
the defendant stood convicted of mail fraud and interstate
transportation of a check that had been obtained by fraud and
money laundering. The trial judge enhanced the sentence for
obstruction of justice,3 2 making the "finding" that the defendant
had perjured himself at trial.
[Ailmost everything that Mr. Sassanelli said was contrary to
what the Court believes were the facts in this particular
matter, as articulated by the other witnesses. And therefore,
the Court believes, number one, that there is no
double-dipping [double punishment] so to speak, because on
the perjury charge itself there's [sic] no points added. And as
to the perjury at the time of trial, the Court believes that the
two points should be added in and will do.2
In prior cases, the Sixth Circuit had held that the sentencing
judge could not merely rely upon the jury verdict, but instead must
make a specific finding that the defendant committed perjury.
That means that the court must lay out in the record some specific
329. 507 U.S. 87 (1993).
330. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 97. See also Barry Johnson, If at First You Don't Succeed
- Abolishing the Use of Acquitted Conduct in Guidelines Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. REV. 153
(1996). The uninitiated may be even more surprised by the possibility that uncharged or
unconvicted conduct might be used to enhance a sentence for another conviction, and then
subsequently provide the basis for another charge and conviction. That is, the Double
Jeopardy Clause apparently does not preclude the government from seeking to punish a
defendant for the same conduct that was previously used to enhance a sentence. See United
States v. Grisanti, 116 F.3d 984 (2d Cir. 1997) (collecting cases).
331. 118 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1997) (in this case the Sixth Circuit adopted the view that
materiality is a question of fact for the jury).
332. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (1996), which provides for enhancement if the defendant
committed, suborned, or attempted to suborn perjury.
333. Sassanelli, 118 F3d at 500.
334. See Mathews v. United States, 11 F3d 583 (6th Cir. 1991).
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instances of conflicting testimony and identify the portions of the
defendant's testimony that were materially perjuriousm - that is, a
finding that "encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding
of perjury. "3 6 Under this standard, it was necessary that the
reviewing court reverse Sassanelli's sentence and remand the case
for further proceedings. One assumes that this fish was reeled back
in later.

335. SassaneUi, 118 E3d at 501 (citing United States v. Spears, 49 E3d 1136, 1143 (6th
Cir. 1995)).
336. Id. (citing United States v. Comer, 93 F.3d 1271, 1282 (6th Cir. 1996)).

